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THE 9-307(1) FARM PRODUCTS PUZZLE:
ITS PARTS AND ITS FUTURE

KEITH

G.

MEYER*

I. INTRODUCTION
When thefarmer comes to town
with his wagon broken down,
Oh, thefarmer is the man who feeds them all.
Ifyou 'll only look and see,
I thinkyou will agree
That thefarmer is the man whofeeds them all.
Thefarmer is the man,
Thefarmer is the man, lives on credit til the fall;
Then they take him by the hand,
And they lead him from the land
And the middle man's the one who gets it all.
When the lawyer hangs around
While the butcher cuts a pound,
Oh, thefarmer is the man who feeds them all.
* Proli'tss of Law, University of Kansas; B.A. 1964, Cornell College; I.D. 1967, University of
Iowa. Copyright @ 1984 by Keith G. Meyer, all rights reserved.
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And the preacherand the cook
Go a-strolling by the brook,
Oh, thefarmer is the man who feeds them all.
The farmer is the man,
Thefarmer is the man, lives on credit til thefall;
With the interest rate so high,
It's a wonder he don't die,
For the mortgage man's the one who gets it all.
When the banker says he's broke
And the merchant's up in smoke,
They forget that it's thefarmerfeeds them all.
It would put them to the test
If thefarmer took a rest,
Then they'd know that it's thefarmerfeeds them all.
Oh, thefarmer is the man,
Thefarmer is the man, lives on credit til thefall.
And his pants are wearing thin,
His condition it's a sin,
He'sforgot that he's the man who feeds them all.'
While farmers have experienced financial hard times over the
years, none have been any worse than those experienced during the
last three years. Large debt loads coupled with historically high
interest rates and low farm product prices have produced an
incredible number of financial difficulties for farmers. The question
of whether the mortgage man "gets it all" is one that is asked with
increasing frequency today. This question is particularly germane
when a farmer sells farm products subject to a perfected security
interest and does not remit the proceeds of the sale to the lender.
Ordinarily, if inventory is subject to a perfected security
interest, a buyer in the ordinary course of business 2 takes free of
I. The FarmerIs The Man, a popular song with Midwestern farmers in the 1880's.
2. Scct ion 1-201(9) of the Unifi)rm Commercial Code provides in relevant part:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or
security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in
the business of selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker. ...
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the security interest created by his seller. 3 When a farmer buys a
combine from an implement dealer or a television for home use
from an appliance dealer who granted a bank a security interest in
its inventory, the sale to the farmer severs the bank's interest in the
combine or television. 4 Farm products are treated differently under
the Uniform Commercial Code (Code). 5 Assuming the secured
party has in no way authorized the sale of the collateral, section 9"Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on secured or
unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or documents of title under a preexisting contract for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in
total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
L .(:.(:
S 1-201(9) (1978).
3. U.C.C. 5 9-307 (1978). Section 9-307(1) provides:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section 1-201) other than a
person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes free
of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected
and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
Id.
4. See id.
5. See U.C.C. S§ 9-109(3) (definition of "farm products"); 9-203(l)(a) (formal requirements of
security agreement covering crops); 9-307 (when a buyer of farm products takes free of security
interest); 9-312(2) (priority of secured party who gives new value to enable debtor to produce crops);
9-401(1)(a), (b) (place of filing in order to perfect a security interest in farm products); 9-402(1), (3)
(form of financing statement covering crops).
Unless otherwise indicated, the citations throughout this Article are to the Uniform
Commercial Code. As ofJanuary 1984, 41 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the bulk
of the 1972 official revisions to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The states are: Alabama
(seeALA. CODE SS 7-9-101 to -507 (1977 & Supp. 1983)); Alaska (seeALASKA STAT. §§ 45.09.101 to
.507 (1980 & Supp. 1983)); Arizona (seeArtiz. REv. STAT. §§ 44-3101 to -3153 (1967 & Supp. 1983));
Arkansas (seeARK. STAT. ANN. S 85-9-101 to -507 (1961 & Supp. 1983)); California (seeCAL. CoM.
CODE SS 9101 to 9508 (West 1964 & Supp. 1984)); Colorado (seeCOLO. REV. STAT. S§ 4-9-101 to
-507 (1974 & Supp. 1983)); Connecticut (see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. SS 42a-9-101 to -507 (West
1960 & Supp. 1983)); Florida (seeFLA. STAT. ANN. 5S 679.9-101 to -507 (West 1966 & Supp. 1983));
Georgia (seeGA. CODE ANN. §§ 109A-9-101 to -507 (1979 & Supp. 1982)); Hawaii (seeHAWAII REV.
STAT. SS 490:9-101 to -507 (1976 & Supp. 1983)); Idaho (seeIDAHO CODE §S 28-9-101 to -507 (1980 &
Supp. 1983)); Illinois (see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, §§ 9-101 to -507 (Smith-Hurd 1974 & Supp.
1983)); Iowa (see IowA CODE ANN. SS 554.9101 to .9507 (West 1967 & Supp. 1983)); Kansas (see
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-9-101 to -508 (1983 & Supp. 1983)); Maine (seeME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
5 1) 1 to -507 (1964 & Supp. 1983)): Maryland (seeMo. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to -507
(1975 & Supp. 1983)); Massachusetts (see MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, 5§ 9-101 to -507 (West
1958 & Supp. 1983)); Michigan (seeMicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 440.9101 to .9507 (1967 & Supp.
1983)); Minnesota (see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.9-101 to -508 (West 1966 & Supp. 1984));
Mississippi (seeMiss. CODE ANN. S 75-9-101 to -507 (1981 & Supp. 1983)); Montana (see MONT.
CODE ANN. §530-9-101 to -511 (.1983)): Nebraska (see NRB. REV. STAT. U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to -507
(1980 & Supp. 1980, 1982)); Nevada (see NEv. REV. STAT. SS 104.9101 to .9507 (1979 & Supp.
1983)); New Hampshire (seeN.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 382-A:9-101 to -507 (1961 & Supp. 1983));
New Jersey (seeN.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A:9-101 to -507 (West 1962 & Supp. 1983)); New York (see
N.Y. U.C.C. LAW §§ 9-101 to -507 (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1983)); North Carolina (seeN.C. GEN.
STAT. SS 25-9-101 to -607 (1965 & Supp. 1983)); North Dakota (seeN.D. CENT. CODE §§ 41-09-01 to
-53 (1983)); Ohio (see OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1309.01 to .50 (Page 1979, Supp. 1983 & Interim
Supp. 1983)); Oklahoma (see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 9-101 to -507 (West 1963 & Supp.
1983)); Oregon (seeOR. REV. STAT. S§ 79.1010 to .5070 (1981)); Pennsylvania (see PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 9101 to 9507 (Purdon 1983)); Rhode Island (seeR.I. GEN. LAWS SS 6A-9-101 to -507 (1970
& Supp. 1983)); South Dakota (seeS.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S5 57A-9-102 to -507 (1980 & Supp.
1983)); Texas (seeTEx. Bus. & Cot. CODE ANN. 55 9.101 to .507 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1984));
Ui:111 (s UTAH Coin: ANN. 55 70A-9-101 to -507 (1980 & Supp. 1983)); Virginia (see VA. CoD:
, 89-101 to -507 (1965 & Supp. 1983)); Washington (see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §5 62A.9-101 to 507 (1-166& Supp. 1983)); West Virginia (see W. VA. CooE 55 46-9-101 to -507 (1966 & Supp.
1983)): Wisconsin (seeWis. STAT. ANN. S 409.101 to .507 (West 1964 & Supp. 1983)); Wyoming (see
Wvo. SiAr. §§34-21-901 to -966 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1983)).
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307(1) of the Code allows the secured party, who has a perfected
security interest, to pursue the farm products collateral into the
hands of the buyer. 6 Accordingly, when a producer sells livestock or
crops subject to a perfected security interest, but does not use the
proceeds from the sale to repay the lender's loan and defaults, the
secured party may successfully bring a conversion action against
the buyer or replevin the goods. 7 This means the buyer must pay
twice.
This rule has produced a great deal of litigation and much
criticism. One wonders how to deal with this problem and whether
the rule should be retained. This Article will analyze the
requirements of the rule and suggest ways in which to deal with the
problem. Then, the Article will examine the efficacy and
desirability of the rule.
II. THE OPERATION OF SECTION 9-307(1)
In analyzing how the farm products rule of the UCC operates,
it is necessary to examine sections 9-306(2) and 9-307(1) of the
UCC in some depth. Section 9-306(2) provides: "Except where this
Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition
thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party
in the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any
identifiable proceeds .... ",8 The major exception to the provisions
of section 9-306(2) exists in section 9-307(1), which provides:
Since few states that adopted the 1972 revisions did so without making revisions of their own,
the reader is warned not to rely upon any interpretations or quotations of the Uniform Commercial
Code within this Article without first checking the local provision to see if in fact it is identical to
sections referred to herein.
6. U.C.C. S 9-307(1) (1978). See supra note 3 for the text of § -9-307(1). See also U.C.C. 5 9301(1) (c).
7. See U.C.C. S 9-307(1). One commentator uses the following illustration of the S 9-307(1) rule:
[Ajssume that Bank holds a perfected security interest in all of Farmer Jones's
livestock. Farmer takes a load of hogs to the sale barn where the hogs are purchased by
a packing house. Although the packing house is a buyer in the ordinary course of
business, the good faith purchase does not cut off Bank's security interest in the hogs.
Even after the hogs are slaughtered and hanging in the packing house the bank can
repossess them and give them out as Christmas hams to its employees. Nor is that the
full extent of the "farm products" exception. If the packing house is quick enough to
package the meat and sell it to a grocery chain before bank's repossession, bank can
repossess the pork chops from the grocery shelves, ifthe meat is identifiable. It can do so
by virtue of the fact that under 9-307(1) a purchaser takes free only of security interests
created by his seller. Since the security interest in the hogs was created by Farmer Jones,
the grocery chain's purchase from the packing house is not free from and does not cut
off Banker's security interest.
J.

WHITE&

R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 525-13,

at 1071 (1980) (emphasis added).
8. U.C.C. 59-306(2)(1978).

1984]

U.C.C. 9-307(1)

4u

A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection
(9) of Section 1-201) other than a person buying farm
products from a person engaged in farming operations
takes free of a security interest created by his seller even
though the security interest is perfected and even though
the buyer knows of its existence. 9
Thus, to qualify for this special protection, the lender must
establish that the seller sold farm products and that the lender had a
perfected security interest in the farm products sold.
A.

FARM PRODUCTS DEFINED

The definition of farm products is found in section 9-109(3),
which provides:
"[F]arm

products".

.

are crops or livestock or

supplies used or produced in farming operations or...
are products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured
states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup,
milk and eggs), and.

.

.

are in the possession of a debtor

engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming
operations. If goods are farm products they are neither
equipment nor inventory.

.. . ,0

This definition contains three parts: (1) the goods must be "crops
or livestock or supplies used or produced in farming operations
or. . . are products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured
(2) the goods must be in the "possession of the
states. .";"
debtor. .. ,";, and (3) the debtor must be "engaged in raising,

fattening, grazing, or other farming operations.",' 3 These
requirements are not self-defining: the Code does not define them
4
and the comments to the Code provide only marginal assistance. '
9. Id. § 9-307(1).
10. Id. S 9-109(3). Inventory is defined as:

SIcis held by a person who holds them for sale or lease or to be furnished under
contracts of service or if he has so furnished them, or if they are raw materials, work in
process or materials used or consumed in a business. Inventory of a person is not to be
classified as his equipment.
Id- S 9-109(4). Equipment is defined as "[items] used or bought for use primarily in business
(including farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or a governmental
subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included in the definitions of inventory, farm products
or consumer goods ...." Id. S 9-109(2).

11.Id. S 9-109(3).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. § 9-109 comment 4.
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Generally, the lender can satisfy the first criterion easily.
Crops obviously include such things as feed grains (corn, grain5
sorghum, and soybeans), wheat, hay, vegetables, nuts, and fruits.1
It is also clear under the Code with the 1972 revisions that crops
include growing crops or crops to be grown. 16 It is not clear,
however, whether harvested crops are crops within the meaning of
the Code. Harvested crops could arguably be a product of a crop or
the term "crops" could be construed broadly to include harvested
crops. 17 In addition, "crops" would appear to cover payments in
kind (PIK). 18 Livestock would include all types of animals: cattle,2219
2
swine, chickens, 20 domestic fish, ' and unborn young of animals.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Greenwich Mill & Elev. Co., 291 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ohio
1968) (soybeans are farm products).
16. U.C.C. 5S 9-105(1)(h); -203 (1). Section 9-105(l)(h) provides:
"Goods" includes all things which are movable at the time the security interest
attaches or which are fixtures (Section 9-313), but does not include money,
documents, instruments, accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles, or minerals or
the like (including oil and gas) before extraction. "Goods" also includes standing
timber which is to be cut and removed under a conveyance or contract for sale, the
unborn young of animals, and growing crops....
Id. 5 9-105(1)(h). Section 9-203(1) provides in part:
Subject to the provisions of Section 4-208 on the security interest of a collecting
bank, Section 8-321 on security interests in securities and Section 9-113 on a security
interest arising under the Article on Sales, a security interest is not enforceable against
the debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to
agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a
description of the collateral and in addition, when the security interest
covers crops growing or to be grown or timber to be cut, a description of the
land concerned.
Id. 9-203(1)(a).
17. When grain is stored and a warehouse receipt or scale ticket represents an obligation of the
warehouse to deliver, a question arises concerning whether the collateral is now the document of
title. See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of warehouse receipts. See also
Meyer, "Crops" as Collateralfor an Article 9 Security Interest and Related Problems, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 3, 6,
11-16, 23-24 (1982).
18. In 1983, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) initiated a special program
of Payient in Kind (PIK) for not planting 1983 crops of wheat, corn, grain sorghun, upland cotton,
and rice. See 48 Fed. Reg. 1694 (1983). The USDA paid farmers in commodities as compensation for
diverting a part of the land that was normally planted. Id. Much of the commodities were owned by
lie givernment, but some were owned by the farmer. The USDA was to send the farmer a "letter of
entitlement" representing the right to receive a specific kind and quantity of commodity stored in a
particular place. Id. A farmer receiving a letter had five months free storage. Id.
19. See U.C.C. S 9-105(1)(h); -109(3) (1978). See supra note 16 for the text of S 9-105(l)(h).
Section 9-109(3) provides that:
'.

I Farn products'
. . are crops or livestock or supplies used or produced in farning
operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states
(such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and eggs), and if they are in the
possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming
operations. If goods are farm products they are neither equipment nor inventory....
U.G.C. 9-109(3) (1978).
20. See U.C.C. 5 9-109(3) comment 4.
21. For a general discussion of aquaculture, see Grossman & Westgren, Aquaculture in Illinois:
The State &Federal Legal & Regulatory Environment, 1982 S. ILL. U.L.J. 193-248.
22. See U.C.C. 5 9-105(1)(h). See supra note 16 for the text of 5 9-105(1)(h).
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The possession issue can arise when a farmer stores grain in a
commercial warehouse or when a commercial feedlot is fattening
the debtor's cattle. This Article will consider each of these
situations.
At harvest, a grain farmer may store some or all of his crop on
the farm or at a local elevator.2 3 When the farmer stores the
harvested grain on his farm, no problem with the possession
requirement exists inasmuch as the debtor-farmer has physical
possession of the grain. The grain stored in an elevator or
warehouse is another matter.
Upon deposit of the grain in the elevator, the farmer will
generally receive either a negotiable or nonnegotiable warehouse
receipt. 24 While the grain is in the elevator the farmer still owns it
and he will decide when to sell it, but obviously he does not have
physical possession of the grain. Moreover, since grain is a fungible
product, the exact grain that the farmer deposited will have been
commingled with other similar grain. Assuming that elevator
personnel issue a warehouse receipt,

25

a document of title 26 is now

23. See Meyer, supra note 17, at 6.
24. See U.C.C. 5 1-201(15), (45) (1978). A document of title, as defined in the Uniform
Commercial Code, includes:
[Bill of lading, dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse receipt or order for the delivery
of goods, and also any other document which in the regular course of business or
financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the person in possession of it is
entitled to receive, hold and dispose of the document and the goods it covers. To be a
document of title a document must purport to be issued by or addressed to a bailee and
purport to cover goods in the bailee's possession which are either identified or are
fungible portions of an identified mass.
Id. S 1-201(15). A warehouse receipt is a "receipt issued by a person engaged in the business of
storing goods for hire." Id. § 1-201(45).
25. Usually the farmer will receive a weight or scale ticket first and later receive a warehouse
receipt. A weight or scale ticket will normally show the date, the name of the depositor, gross weight
of truck or wagon, net weight, test weight of the kind of grain, and the signature of the agent of the
elevator. Normally these tickets will be serially numbered. The warehouse receipt, which will either
be a state or federally approved form, will contain, among other things, a statement whether the
,grain received is to be delivered to bearer, to a specified person, or to his order; the date of the
issuance of the receipt, the net weight of the grain along with the grade; and the words "negotiable"
" iorin
iiiigotiablc.'" h must also be noted that section 7-202 prescribes a form for warehouse
receipts. See U.C.C. 5 7-202 (1978). The failure to follow this form will result in liability for any loss
caused by the misdescription of the received goods. Id. S 7-203. Some state and all federally licensed
elevators must issue warehouse receipts. Those that do not issue receipts rely on weight tickets and
settlement sheets. Clearly, farmers should obtain warehouse receipts. For cases dealing with the
,itIiS" owa1h0'iusi receipt holders and weight ticket holders, see In re Binecki Bros., 38 Bankr. 519
(Bnkr. EI). Mich. 1984) (relationship between elevator and farmer determined by intent of
parties); In re Durand Milling Co., 9 Bankr. 669 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981) (presumption of
bailment when no warehouse receipt issued); Farmers Elev. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewett, 394 F.2d 898,
899-900 (10th Cir. 1968) (warehouseman gave depositors scale tickets rather than warehouse
receipts; surety was required to pay the holders of the scale tickets since the warehouseman violated
his duty under the applicable act by not issuing warehouse receipts as required); Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co. v. Kansas, 274 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1957) (surety liable to holders of scale tickets
because warehouse receipts were required by law); United States v. Luther, 225 F.2d 499, 504 (10th
Cir. 1955) (title to milo and wheat in possession of bankrupt grain company belonged to holders of
warehouse receipts since grain company only held the grain as bailee); In re Cheyenne Wells Elev.
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 275, 278-79 (D. Colo. 1966) (holders of warehouse receipts entitled to pro rata
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involved, which begs the question whether the grain is still a farm
product. Ignoring the document of title question, a problem with
the requirement that the grain be in the possession of a debtor
engaged in farming arises when a crop or product of a crop exists.
The Code does not define possession and therefore it is unclear
precisely what the drafters meant by its usage. If possession means
physical possession by the farmer who owns the grain, it would
mean the grain in the elevator ceases to be a farm product. 2 7 On the
other hand, one may argue that the drafters wanted possession to
be construed broadly, and thus, one should consider the
warehoused grain to be in the "possession" of the farmer. The
absence of the word "physical" in the definition section of the
Code supports the broad interpretation. 28 In addition, some Code
sections suggest a broad construction of "possession."
One
example is section 9-205, which allows the debtor significant
control over the property. 2 9 Also, section 9-305 could support a
broad construction of possession. 30 Section 9-305 provides that
"[i]f such collateral other than goods covered by a negotiable
document is held by a bailee, the secured party is deemed to have
possession from the time the bailee -receive notification of the
secured party's interest. "31 While section 9-305 deals with
perfection, one can argue that nonnegotiable warehouse receipts in
the hands of a farmer should be sufficient to constitute possession
for the purposes of the definition of"farm products." Moreover, if
a warehouse issues a negotiable receipt, the negotiable receipt
would represent ownership of the goods, and thus the farmer
possessing title would be in possession of the goods. 32 In short, the
distribution of remaining grain in bankrupt elevator); Stevens v. Farmers Elev. Mut. Ins. Co., 197
Kan. 74, -,
415 P.2d 236, 241 (1966) (holders of weight tickets able to recover against surety
because warehouse receipts were required).
26. U.C.C. 5 1-201(15) (1978) (definition of "document of title"). See supra note 24 for the text
of S 1-201(15).
27. See U.C.C. § 9-109 comment 4 (1978). Comment 4 states that "[wihen crops or livestock or
their products come into the possession of a person not engaged in farming operations, they cease to
be 'farm products.' " Id.
28. See id. § 1-201(15).
29. See id. § 9-205. Section 9-205 provides:
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of liberty in
the debtor to use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral (including
returned or repossessed goods) or to collect or compromise accounts or chattel paper,
or to accept the return of goods or make repossessions, or to use, commingle or dispose
of proceeds, or by reason of the failure of the secured party to require the debtor to
account for proceeds or replace collateral. This section does not relax the requirements
of possession where perfection of a security interest depends upon possession of the
collateral by the secured party or by a bailee.
Id.
30. Id. 59-305.
31. Id.
32. Id. 5 9-304 comment 2. See also id. § 9-305 comment 2. Comment 2 states that "[plossession
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farmer is still the owner of the harvested crop and it is simply in the
hands of an agent. The farmer must pay storage fees and the
farmer, not the elevator, decides when to sell. One should also note
that Professor Gilmore stated in his treatise, "Goods cease to be
'farm products' when they are subjected to any manufacturing
operation... or when they move from the possession and ownership of
33
a farmer to that of a non-farmer'(canner, cooperative, etc.)."
Assuming arguendo that a court determines that the stored
crops are not "farm products," the court still must classify the
crops. One possibility is that the court could consider the
warehouse receipt proceeds of "farm products," since the farmer
received the warehouse receipt in "exchange" for the crops. 34 This
reasoning is improper because the apparent thrust of section 9-306
is that the debtor has given up all control and interest in the
35
collateral, which is not the case with stored commodities.
If courts considered stored grain a "good," the only possible
category of goods it could belong to would be "inventory."
Comment 3 to section 9-109 states, "The principal test to
determine whether goods are inventory is that they are held for
immediate or ultimate sale. Implicit in the definition is the criterion
' 36
that the prospective sale is in the ordinary course of business."
Severe problems exist, however, by concluding that the grain is
"inventory." While most grain farmers will hold their grain for
sale, the drafters of the Code chose to treat the farmer differently by
' 37
not defining the farmer's goods held for sale as "inventory."
Also, Professor Gilmore, in describing "farm products" stated,
" 'Farm products' are in effect a farmer's inventory: although
there is no 'held for sale' language in the definition, it is in the
highest degree unlikely that farm products not destined for sale will
ever show up as collateral for loans." 3 8 All this appears to establish
may be by the secured party himself or by an agent on his behalf: itis of course clear, however, that
the debtor or a person controlled by him cannot qualify as such an agent for the secured party.

Id.
For cases dealing with perfection by possession, see, e.g., In re Copeland, 531 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir.
1976) (escrow agent can retain possession); Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Center, Inc., 490 P.2d 1213
(Alaska 1971) (possession not established by creditor removing equipment from boat and preparing
it for winter); Lee v. Cox, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 807 (M.D. Tenn. 1976) (registration
papers of Arabian horses not possession).
33. 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 12.3, at 374 (1965) (emphasis
added).
34. Section 9-306(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides in part: - 'Proceeds' includes
whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or
proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-306(1)(1978).
35. See id.
36. Id. S 9-109 comment 3.
37. Seeid. S 9-109.
38. 1G. GILMORE, supra note 33, § 12.3, at 373-74. For a case dealing with when a good is "farm
roducts" or "inventory," see United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th cir. 1971). In Hext the
Uhnited States took a security interest in 578 bales of cotton as farm products knowing that Hext had
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that courts and others should classify the stored grain as "farm
products."
One case exists that implicitly held that stored commodities
39
remain farm products. In Oxford Production Credit Association v. Dye
the purchaser argued that stored cotton was not a farm product.
The court held otherwise, but gave no reasons for its holding other
than that Dye had purchased the cotton from a farmer who had
40
produced it.
The recent case of Garden City Production Credit Association v.
International Cattle Systems 4 t involved the possession requirement
when livestock was the collateral. Production Credit Association
(PCA) had a security agreement that covered all of the debtor's
cattle, including after-acquired cattle. 4 2 The cattle were not in the
physical possession of the debtor-owner. 43 Rather, International
Cattle Systems (ICS), a feedlot operation, apparently was fattening
the cattle for the debtor and always had physical possession of the
cattle. 4 4 ICS sold the cattle to meat packers and PCA did not
receive payment for its loan. 45 PCA sued ICS and the packers in
conversion. 46 The court held that the cattle were not farm products
but were instead inventory. 4 The court reasoned that the debtor
never had possession and ICS was not the debtor's agent for
purposes of establishing possession. 48 In short, the court apparently
read the possession requirement of section 9-109(3) to apply only to
physical possession. The court did not, however, explain this
conclusion.
While the facts are not entirely clear in International Cattle
Systems, the analogy to the stored grain situation is striking. The
farmer was apparently still the owner of the cattle, was undoubtedly
the capability of transferring them into the inventory of his gin and selling them in the ordinary
course of business. Id. at 814. Therefore, when Hext sold the cotton in the ordinary course of
business, the buyers took free of any security interest and were thus insulated from a conversion suit
brought by the government. Id.
See also In re K. L. Smith Enters., Ltd., 2 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (laying hens were
"livestock" and eggs "produce of livestock" within meaning of Uniform Commercial Code and
could not be considered either "equipment" or "inventory" even though the egg production units
were highly mechanized); First State Bank v. Producers Livestock Mktg. Ass'n Non-Stock Coop.,
200 Neb. 12, 261 N.W.2d 854 (1978) (cattle purchased by cattle trader and offered for immediate
sale are "inventory" and not "farm products").
39. 368 So.2d 241 (Miss. 1979).
40. Oxford Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Dye, 368 So.2d 241, 242 (Miss. 1979).
41.32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1207 (D. Kan. 1981).
42. Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. International Cattle Sys., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1207, 1208 (D. Kan. 1981).
43. Id. at 1209.
44. Id. at 1207.
45. Id. at 1211-12.
46. Id. at 1208.
47. Id. at 1209-10.
48. Id.
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paying the feedlot for its services, and probably was determining
when to sell the cattle. Consequently, the arguments made about
possession and stored grain apply when owned livestock are not in
that one
the physical possession of the debtor. This all assumes
49
case.
the
normally
is
which
cattle,
the
could identify
The final part of the definition, which the lender must also
satisfy, is that the debtor must be "engaged in raising, fattening,
grazing or other farming operations." 50 Again, the Code does not
define these terms, but comment 4 to section 9-109 does provide
some guidance. Comment 4 provides in part:
Goods are "farm products" only if they are in the
possession of a debtor engaged in farming operations.
Animals in a herd of livestock are covered whether they
are acquired by purchase or result from natural increase.
Products of crops or livestock remain farm products so
long as they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in
farming operations and have not been subjected to a
manufacturing process. The terms "crops", "livestock"
and "farming operations" are not defined; however, it is
obvious from the text that "farming operations" includes
raising livestock as well as crops; similarly, since eggs are
products of livestock, livestock includes fowl.
When crops or livestock or their products come into
of a person not engaged in farming
possession
the
operations they cease to be "farm products". If they
come into the possession of a marketing agency for sale or
distribution or of a manufacturer or processor as raw
5
materials, they become inventory. '
Courts having to define farming operations have reacted in
different ways. Some have construed the term narrowly,
concluding that it means a conventional farm operation and does
not include farm-related or farm-like activities. 52 Others have
construed the term quite broadly. 53 Some have not really defined it
at all, apparently choosing to rely upon the rule, "I know it when I
seeit. ',54
49. Cattle will be identifiable by pen number or by some other method.
50. U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (1978). See supra note 10 and accompanying text for a definition and
discussion of "farm products."
51. U.C.C. § 9-109 comment 4 (1978).
52. In re Collins, 3 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1980); In re Blease, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 450 (D.N.J. 1978).
53. InreK. L. Smith Enters., Ltd., 2 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
54. See, e.g_, Oxford Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Dye, 368 So.2d 241 (Miss. 1979); Belgrade State
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In the ordinary case when the debtor lives on the land and its
sole business is the production of crops such as wheat, cotton, or
corn, or the raising or fattening of cattle for slaughter, no problem
exists in holding that it is "engaged in farming operations." 5 5 All
cases, however, are not this clear. One illustration of this is when
the good being produced is one not traditionally associated with
farming, such as raising catfish for sale in a man-made pond. It
would seem that the fish could be either livestock or crops, and the
debtor's purpose is raising crops or fattening livestock.
Accordingly, one should consider the fish farm products. 56 This is
considerably different from the pet shop that buys fish for
immediate resale. One should consider these fish inventory to the
57
pet shop.
The farm operation issue can also exist when considering
animals that one customarily associates with the farm. In re K. L.
5 8 illustrates
Smith Enterprises
this situation. In Smith Enterprises the
debtor was in the egg production business. 5 9 The egg producing
chickens were housed in production units that were "large, circular
structures containing four concentric circles of caged hens, 10 tiers
high. "60 In addition to chickens, the debtor always had eggs in its
possession. 61 The court had to determine whether farm products
were involved. 62 Utilizing section 9-109(3) and the official
comments to that section, the court reasoned that the hens were
"livestock" and the eggs were "products of livestock. ",63 The court
also determined that the debtor was engaged in "farming
operations. "64 In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the
bank's argument that the eggs lost their characteristic as farm
products because the debtor's sole business was the sophisticated,
mechanized production of eggs, and that no one was living on the
property where the egg production units were located. 65 In short,
Bank v. Elder, 157 Mont. 1,482 P.2d 135 (1971). Another approach to the definition is found in In re
Butler, 3 Bankr. 182, 183-84 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
55. There should be no problem if the person farming the land does not live on the land but
owns it. Also, if a farmer has leased land on a cropshare basis, the crop he receives as rent is farm
products. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of various problems that can
arisc under a cropshare farming operation.
0
56. See U.C.C. 9-1 9(3) comment 4. Seealso Grossman & Westgren, supra note 21. at 193-248.
57. See U .C.C. S 9-109(4) comment 3. See supra note 10 for the definition of" inventory."
58.2 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
59. In re K.L. Smith Enters., Ltd., 2 Bankr. 280, 281 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 282-83. The bank contended that the eggs were "inventory" and the chickens were
"equipment." Id. at 282. The debtor contended they were "farm products" within the meaning of
the Uniform Commercial Code. Id.
63. Id. at 284. The court noted the biological link between the chicken and the egg. Id. at 283.
64. Id. at 283-84.
65. Id. at 283.
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the bank argued that the debtor's business was not a traditional
farming operation. The bank premised its argument upon the
conclusion "that only conventional farming techniques which are
unmechanized, sophisticated, and labor intensive can produce
farm products..
",66 The court chose not to define farming
operations in this manner. Rather, it relied upon cases that defined
farming operations in a broad manner. 67 The court referred to
cattle feeding operations 68 and a tree nursery 69 as illustrations of
farming operations. The court also specifically noted that the loan
involved was made through the bank's agriculture loan
department. 7 0 Consequently, describing the eggs as "inventory"
and the chickens as "equipment" was wrong and the security
agreement was defective. 71
Cattle feedlots and similar operations raise issues concerning
farm products. Clearly, cattle in the possession of a person whose
sole business is feeding cattle are farm products and cattle in the
hands of a cattle trader whose sole business is marketing are
inventory. 72 It is unclear, however, what type of collateral is
involved when the debtor fattens animals and is also a trader or
marketer of animals. Arguably, the real issue is whether the
animals are inventory and the principal test is whether they are
held for immediate sale. 73 When the debtor holds the animals for
lengthy periods of time and its profit motive relates to the fattening
or producing of progeny rather than making money on marketing,
66. Id.
67. Id. at 283-84.
68. Id. See Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat'l Bank, 426 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1970) (bank failed to
perfect security interest in cattle being fattened in feedlots; therefore, its security interest in those
"farm products" was cut off when sold to an innocent purchaser). It should be noted that once cattle
go into the possession of a packer, the cattle cease to be classified as "farm products" and become
part of the packer's inventory notwithstanding the fact that there was an oral agreement between the
seller and the packer that the title would not pass and price would not be determined until carcass
grade was determined. First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71,
-_, 286 N.E.2d 203, 209-11
(1972).
69. See Mountain Credit v. Michiana Lumber & Supply, 31 Colo. App. 112, 498 P.2d 967
(1972) (logging operation not a farming operation but nursery may be).
70. 2 Bankr. at 283. There was a large amount of money involved in this case in that the bank
originally loaned the debtor $2,400,000. Id. at 281. The safest thing for a secured party to do if there
is any doubt as to whether collateral is farm products or inventory is to describe the collateral
generically in both the security agreement and financing statement. Then if farm products are filed
in the county where the debtor resides and inventory -is filed with the secretary of state, the secured
creditor should file in both places.
71. Id. at 284.
72. See, e.g., Security Nat'l Bank v. Belleville Livestock Comm'n, 619 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1979)
(person was a cattle feeder and the cattle were "farm products"); First State Bank v. Maxfield, 485
F.2d 71 (10th Cir. 1973) (cattle owned were used in ranching operation but were "inventory");
Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat'l Bank, 426 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1970) (when cattle are purchased for
fattening, they are classified as "farm products"); United States v. Mid-States Sales Co., 336 F.
Supp. 1099 (D. Neb. 1971) (cattle purchased as part of dairy herd are "farm products"); In re
(Cadwell. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 710 (E.D. Cal. 1970) (cattle being fattened are "farm
products").
73. SeeU.C.C. 5 9-109 comment 3.
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a farming operation exists and the animals held for fattening are
farm products and animals being traded are inventory. 74 As one
court observed in this regard, "In borderline cases the principal use
75
to which the property is put should be considered determinative."
If a court finds that the debtor is a marketing agency it may
also consider all animals in its possession inventory even though
some of them are being fattened. The court considered this
situation in FarmersState Bank v. Webel, 76 in which the lender had a
security agreement with a business, Pigs, which bought and sold
feeder pigs. 77 One of the questions in this case was whether Pigs'
pigs were farm products. 78 The court stated that Pigs was only a
marketing agent who sold inventory, not farm products. That Pigs
was also engaged in fattening operations, the court determined,
"was at most incidental to the marketing operation and came about
only because some of its inventory (feeder pigs) was unsold and the
only feasible disposition was to fatten and market. "80 This would
suggest that if the primary business of the operation in question is
the fattening or raising of animals, the fact that it trades or markets
small numbers of animals will not make it a nonfarm operation.
One probably should not consider a business a marketing agency
until its marketing becomes more than fifty percent of its business.
It must be stressed that comment 4 to section 9-109 provides in
part: "If [livestock] come into the possession of a marketing agency
for sale or distribution... they become inventory. "81
Another situation that might raise the "farm operations" issue
is when the prospective debtor owns 240 acres of land but is a full-

time employee of a nonfarm business and lives in town. The debtor
74. In re Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 193, 196 (W.D.
Wis. 1976). The court did not feel the result would change because Charolais Breeding Ranches was
not "a farmer in the conventional sense." Id. So long as the cattle were not held for marketing, the
cattle could be classified as "farm products." Id.
75. First State Bank v. Producers Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 200 Neb. 12, 16, 261 N.W.2d 854,
858 (1978). Using this test, the court found some cattle to be "farm products" and others to be
"inventory." Id. at __,
261 N.W.2d at 858. Note, however, "farm products" is the only
definition that attempts to describe a type of goods rather than a use to which goods are put. See 1 G.
(;tLMORK, supra note 33, at 373.

76. 113 I11.App. 3d 87, 446 N.E.2d 525(1983).
77. Farmers State Bank v. Webel, 113 Il1. App. 3d at __,
446 N.E.2d at 526-27 (1983). Pigs
basically bought and sold feeder pigs. Id. at __
, 446 N.E.2d at 526. Some fattening of the pigs,
however, was necessary. Id. If, due to market conditions, a feeder pig exceeded 120 to 130 pounds, it
would be retained and fattened to a weight of 200 to 250 pounds and sold. Id. This "fattening
operation" constituted about five percent of Pig's operation. Id.
78. Id. at __ ,446 N.E.2d at 528-30.
79. Id. at -. , 446 N.E.2d at 529.
80. Id. For other trader or market agent cases, see National Livestock Credit Corp. v. First State
Bank, 503 P.2d 1283 (Okla. Ct. App. 1972) (when debtor executed security agreement with bank
and pr'chased cattle for another, debtor did not have a sufficient interest in the cattle such that they
could be covered under security agreement); Poteet v. Winter Garden Prod. Credit Ass'n, 546
S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (security interest attached to 254 cattle even though debtor
purchased the cattle as agent for a third party).
81. U.C.C. § 9-109 comment 4 (1978).

1984]

U.C.C. 9-307(1)

415

rents the tillable land on a cropshare basis. The landowner seeks a
loan from a bank and wants to put up his share of the winter wheat
currently growing on the land as collateral. Apparently the winter
wheat is a farm product but there are some potential problems. The
first question the court must consider is whether the debtor is
engaged in a farming operation. Since the landlord and tenant have
a cropshare arrangement, the landlord is probably participating in
the major decisions, paying part of the expenses, and deciding
when to sell his grain. Apparently, this would satisfy the farming
operations requirement, notwithstanding the fact that the landlord
does not live on the farm and does not farm the land himself.
Moreover, it is clear under the law of many states that the landlord
has an interest in the crop after it has been planted and he can sell it
or put it up as collateral for a loan. 8 2 A possible problem with the
possession requirement also exists because the landlord does not
have the right to possess the land and thus, cannot possess the crop.
To be sure, the landlord gave the tenant the right to possess the
land, but it would seem that because the wheat is growing on his
ground and he owns part of the crop, he is in possession or, at least,
3
constructive possession of the farm products.
Finally, section 9-307(1) requires the farm products to be
purchased "from a person engaged in farming operations." 8 4 This
seems to be redundant. Once the court establishes that the seller
sold farm products, the seller would have to be engaged in farming
operations since to have farm products the crops and livestock must
be in the possession of one engaged in farming operations. 85
B.

PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST

Section 9-307(1) requires that the goods sold must be farm
82. E.g., Finley v. McClure, 222 Kan. 637, 567 P.2d 851 (1977). North Dakota allows the
landlord to take a security interest in growing and unharvested crops. Section 35-05-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides:
Security interests in growing and unharvested crops are prohibited, and any security
agreement purporting to create a security interest therein shall be void. The provisions
of this section shall not apply to any security interest or lien in favor of the United
States, this state, any county, or any department or agency of any of them, including
the Bank of North Dakota, nor to any banking institution as defined by section 6-0102, nor to any other agricultural lending agency, nor to any security interest created
by contract to secure money advanced or loaned for the purpose of paying government
crop insurance premiums or to secure the purchase price or the rental or improvement
of the land upon which the crops covered by the contract are to be grown.
N.D. CENT. CODE S35-05-01 (1980).
83. None of the other categories of goods would seem to apply. The closest would be inventory.
The cheapest insurance for the lender is to describe the collateral generically and perfect it as both.
84. See U.C.C. S 9-307(1) (1978).
85. See supra notes 52-83 and accompanying text for a discussion on what constitutes a farming
operation.
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products purchased from a person engaged in farm operations, but
the rule will not benefit the lender unless the lender has a perfected
security interest. 86 This is the negative inference of 9-307(1), and
section 9-301(1)(c) provides that an unperfected secured party is
subordinate to a buyer of farm products in the ordinary course of
87
business.
A perfected security interest is established when there is
attachment and perfection. 88 In general, attachment occurs when
value has been given, the debtor has rights in the collateral, and the
debtor has signed a written security agreement creating a security
interest and correctly describing the collateral. 89 The description of
collateral is very important; the agreement should reflect what the
intent of the parties was when they signed the agreement. For a
description to be adequate under the Code, it must reasonably
identify the collateral. 90 The Code does not require that an
agreement use the terms of the code; also, it is much easier to
ascertain what the intent of the parties was at the signing of the
agreement when utilizing non-Code terms. In short, the
description should be all-encompassing and describe the collateral
in terms that a lay person can understand.
When growing crops or crops to be grown are the collateral,
the security agreement must include a description of the real estate
involved. 9 1 The Code does not require a metes and bounds or legal
description. 92 Parties have frequently litigated the adequacy of the
86. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1978). See supra note 3 for the text of § 9-307(1).
87. The 1962 version of § 9-301(l)(c) does not refer to farm products. See U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(c)
(1962) (current version at U.C.C. § 9-301 (1978)).
88. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1978). Section 9-203 provides in pertinent part:

(I) Sub lect to the provisions of Section 4-208 on the security interest of a
collecting bank, Section 8-321 on security interests in securities and Section 9-113 on a
security interest arising under the Article on Sales, a security interest is not
enforceable against the debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral and does
not attach unless:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to
agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a
description of the collateral and in addition, when the security interest
covers crops growing or to be grown or timber to be cut, a description of the
land concerned;
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
(2) A security interest attaches when it becomes enforceable against the debtor
with respect to the collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all of the events specified in
subsection (1) have taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of
attaching.
Id.

9-203(1).(2).
89. Id. For a thorough discussion
not 17.
90. U.C.C. § 9-110 (1978).
9

if

attachment and perfection involving crops, see Meyer, supra

91. Id. § -203(l)(a). See supra note 88 for the text of§ 9-203(l)(a).
92. U.C.C. §§ 9-110: 9-402 comment 5. Section 9-110 states that any description of real estate is

19841

U.C.C. 9-307(1)

417

real estate description. Descriptions that courts have typically
upheld indicate the name of the owner of the land, approximate
number of acres, the county the land is in, popular name, and the
approximate distance from a named town or well-known
landmark. 93
Establishing attachment of the security interest is only half the
battle. Perfection is needed to protect the security interest against
competing third parties such as purchasers, other creditors, and the
trustee in bankruptcy. Perfection occurs when both attachment and
94
the other steps necessary for perfection have been completed.
Filing is essentially the only way to perfect when the debtor is a
farmer. 95 The key to determining where to file is correct
classification of the collateral under the Code.
sufficient if it reasonably identifies the land. Id. S 9-110. Comment 5 to S 9-402 states that the
description need not be by "metes and bounds" but only that it "be sufficient to identify it." Id. § 9402 comment 5. Some states have changed S 9-402.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Oakley, 483 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (real estate description
that included name of debtor, approximate number of acres, county and state, and approximate
distance from a specified town was sufficient); Piggott State Bank v. Pollard Gin Co., 243 Ark. 159,
419 S.W.2d 120 (1967) (description that referred only to seven acres of cotton to be produced by the
debtor on the lands of a third party was insufficient); In re Voelker, 252 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1977)
(description that referred only to 60 acres of growing corn was defective); First State Bank v.
Waychus, 183 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1971) (since there is no requirement that the location of livestock
be described in financing statement the fact that the bank listed the wrong legal description in the
financing statement which covered hogs did not diminish the bank's security interest in the
livestock); Bank of Danville v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 602 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1980) (description that
described location as "farm of Dale Wilson on Lancaster Road, 4 miles from Danville, Boyle
County, Kentucky" was sufficient).
94. U.C.C. S 9-303 (1978).
95. See id. S 9-401 (proper place of filing). The Code has three alternatives for subsection (1) of
S 9-401. They are as follows:
FirstAlternative Subsection (1)
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like (including oil
and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103, or when the
financing statement is filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-313) and the collateral
is goods which are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a
mortgage on the real estate would be filed or recorded;
(b) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of Statel.
Second Alternative Subsection (1)
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is equipment used in farming operations, or farm products,
or accounts or general intangibles arising from or relating to the sale of farm
products by a farmer, or consumer goods, then in the office of the ........
in
the countv of the debtor's residence or if the debtor is not a resident of this state
then in the office of the ........
.in the county where the goods are kept, and
in addition when the collateral is crops growing or to be grown in the office of
lie ........
in the county where the land is located;
(b) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like (including oil
and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103, or when the
financing statement is filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-313) and the collateral
is goods which are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a
mortgage on the real estate would be filed or recorded;
(c) in all other cases, in the office of the ISecretary of State].
Third Alternative Subsection (1)
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is equipment used in farming operations, or farm products,
or accounts or general intangibles arising from or relating to the sale of farm
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There are essentially three possible classifications when
dealing with crops and livestock: farm products, 96 inventory, 97 and
documents of title. 98 Each is generally perfected differently. 99
As for farm products, there are at least three different filing
rules utilized in the United States. In many states, the creditor
must file a financing statement in an office in the county in which
the debtor resides. 100 If growing crops or crops to be grown are the
collateral and the land is located in a different county than the
debtor's residence, the creditor must file a second financing
statement in the county in which the land is located. 101 The creditor
may also need to double file if the debtor is incorporated and the
land upon which crops are growing, or will be grown, is located in
a county other than the corporation's place of business. 10 2 The
practitioner should be careful to check the local state's
requirements on filing as it may have a combination of central
filing and local filing for farm products or it may have only central
filing.
In addition to filing in the appropriate place, the financing
statement must comply with the provisions of section 9-402.
According to section 9-402, the financing statement must contain
''a statement indicating the types, or describing the items of
collateral. ' '103 The function of the description is to put third parties
prducis by a farmer, or consumer goods, then in the office of the ........ in
lIeC ounty ofthe debtor's residence or if the debtor is not a resident of this state
ie n he office of the ........ in the county where the goods are kept, and
inI
add ition when the collateral is crops growing or to be grown in the office of
the........ in the county where the land is located.
(b) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like (including oil
and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103, or when the
financing statement is filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-313) and the collateral
is goods which are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a
mortgage on the real estate would be filed or recorded.
(c) inall other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of State] and in addition, if the
debtor has a place of business in only one county of this state, also in the office
of.........
ofsuch county, or, if the debtor has no place of business in this
stat, but resides in the state, also in the office of. .......
.. ofthe county in
whichIli resides.
U.C.C. S9-401(l) (1978).
96. See U.C.C. S 9-109(3) (1978) (definition of farm products).
97. Id. § 9-109(4) (definition of inventory).
98. Id. 5§ 9-105(1)(f; 1-201(15) (definitions of document of title).
99. Inventory is normally perfected with the secretary of state. Id. § 9-401(1). Perfection of
documents of title turns on whether they are negotiable or nonnegotiable. Id. 55 7-104; 9-304.
100. See id.S 9-401(1) (second and third alternatives of subsection (1)).
101. Id.
102. See id. § 9-401(1), (6).
103. Id. S 9-402(1). Section 9-402 provides:
(1)A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the debtor and the
secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the secured party from
which information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing
address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the
items, of collateral. A financing statement may be filed before a security agreement is
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on notice of the secured party's claim. Comment 2 to section 9-402
made or a security interest otherwise attaches. When the financing statement covers
crops growing or to be grown, the statement must also contain a description of the real
estate concerned. When the financing statement covers timber to be cut or covers
minerals or the like (including oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of
Section 9-103, or when the financing statement is filed as a fixture filing (Section 9313) and the collateral is goods which are or are to become fixtures, the statement must
also comply with subsection (5). A copy of the security agreement is sufficient as a
financing statement if it contains the above information and is signed by the debtor. A
carbon, photographic or other reproduction of a security agreement or a financing
statement is sufficient as a financing statement if the security agreement so provides or
if the original has been filed in this state.
(2) A financing statement which otherwise complies with subsection (1) is
sufficient when it is signed by the secured party instead of the debtor if it is filed to
perfect a security interest in
(a) collateral already subject to a security interest in another jurisdiction when
it is brought into this state, or when the debtor's location is changed to this
state. Such a financing statement must state that the collateral was brought
into this state or that the debtor's location was changed to this state under
such circumstances; or
(b) proceeds under Section 9-306 if the security interest in the original
collateral was perfected. Such a financing statement must describe the
original collateral; or
(c) collateral as to which the filing has lapsed; or
(d) collateral acquired after a change of name, identity or corporate structure
of the debtor (subsection (7)).
(3) A form substantially as follows is sufficient to comply with' subsection (1):
Name of debtor (or assignor) .....................................
A d d ress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Name of secured party (or assignee) ................................
Address ..........
.........
..........
.....
...................
I. This financing statement covers the following types (or items) of property:
(D escrib e) .. . ... . .. . .. ... .. ... . . .. . . . . .. .. .. .. .. . ... . ..
2. (If collateral is crops) The above described crops are growing or are to be
grown on:
(D escribe Real Estate) ....................................
3. (If applicable) The above goods are to become fixtures on
(le)c ribc Real Estate) ..............................
and this
financing statement is to be filed [for record] in the real estate records. (If
the debtor does not have an interest of record) The name of a record owner
is . .. .. ... . ... .. .. .. ... .. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. . ... . ... . ... . ..
4. (If products of collateral are claimed) Products of the collateral are also
covered.
(use
.. .. .. .. .. ... ... . .. .. .. . . ... . ... .. .. .. .
whichever
Signature of Debtor (or Assignor)
is
applicable)
Signature of Secured Party (or Assignee)
(4) A financing statement may be amended by filing a writing signed by both the
debtor and the secured party. An amendment does not extend the period of
effectiveness of a financing statement. If any amendment adds collateral, it is effective
as to the added collateral only from the filing date of the amendment. In this Article,
unless the context otherwise requires, the term "financing statement" means the
original financing statement and any amendments.
(5) A financing statement covering timber to be cut or covering minerals or the
like (including oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103, or a
financing statement filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-313) where the debtor is not a
transmitting utility, must show that it covers this type of collateral, must recite that it
is to be filed [for record] in the real estate records, and the financing statement must
contain a description of the real estate [sufficient if it were contained in a mortgage of
the real estate to give constructive notice of the mortgage under the law of this state]. If
the debtor does not have an interest of record in the real estate, the financing
statement must show the name of a record owner.
(6) A mortgage is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing from
the date of its recording if
(a) the goods are described in the mortgage by item or type; and
(b) the goods are or are to become fixtures related to the real estate described in
the mortgage; and
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makes clear that the Code adopted a "notice filing" system. 10 4 The
filed notice is sufficient when it indicates that a secured party may
have a security interest in the collateral described. 105 Section 9-110
and its comment show that the Code does not contemplate exact
and detailed descriptions.10 6 The description must reasonably
identify what is described. Merely indicating the types of collateral
should be enough. The practitioner should remember that the
functions of the financing statement are significantly different from
those of the security agreement. 107
While the function of the security agreement and the financing
statement are different, the same description used in the security
agreement can and should be used in the financing statement.
Again, it is not necessary to use Code terminology. The financing
statement must also have a real estate description when growing
crops or crops to be grown are involved. 108
III. THE EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION THE FARM PRODUCTS RULE

9-306(2)

-

Under section 9-307(1) the buyer of "farm products from a
person engaged in farm operations" will take subject to a perfected
(c) the mortgage complies with the requirements for a financing statement in
this section other than a recital that it is to be filed in the real estate records;
and
(d) the mortgage is duly recorded.
No fee with reference to the financing statement is required other than the regular
recording and satisfaction fees with respect to the mortgage.
(7) A financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor if it gives the
individual, partnership or corporate name of the debtor, whether or not it adds other
trade names or names ofpartners. Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case
of an organization its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed financing
statement becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to perfect a security
interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after the change,
unless a new appropriate financing statement is filed before the expiration of that time.
A filed financing statement remains effective with respect to collateral transferred by
the debtor even though the secured party knows of or consents to the transfer.
(8) A financing statement substantially complying with the requirements of this
section is effective even though it contains minor errors which are not seriously
misleading. Amended in 1972.
Id. S9-402.
104. See id. comment 2.
105. Id.
106. Seeid. §9-110 & comment.
107. Compare id. § 9-203 and comments (requirements of a valid and enforceable security
agreement) with § 9-402 and comments (requirements of a sufficient financing statement).
108. See id. 5 9-402(1) & comments. See supra notes 103 for the text of § 9-402(1). Section 9402(8) provides that a financing statement containing minor errors, not seriously misleading, which
substantially complies with § 9-402(1) is still valid. See id. § 9-402(8). The omission of any real estate
description, however, would not be considered a minor error. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Calvin
Pickle Co., 516 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1973) (financing statement that failed to describe lands on which
"secured" crops were grown was not a "minor error" and thus did not convey a security interest in
those crops). Cf U.C.C. S 9-203(1)(a) (security interest will not attach unless security agreement
contains description ofthe land when security agreement covers growing crops).
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security interest.' 09 There is, however, a major exception to this
rule in section 9-306(2), which provides: "[A] security interest
continues in collateral notwithstanding sale
unless the
disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable
proceeds .... "110
Inasmuch as security agreements almost never specifically
authorize sale of farm products,'
the crucial words in this section
are "or otherwise."'1 2 Neither the Code nor the comments define
"otherwise" or give any guidance to its meaning. Courts have
generally considered the issue to be whether the secured party has
in any way authorized the sale. Some courts have imported to the
Code the common

law notions of waiver,' 1

3

estoppel,"

4

and

5

consent."1 If the sale was authorized, the secured party loses the
right to seek redress from the buyer. Sometimes courts have
considered the question of authorization as a question of fact. "1 6 In
any event, the courts are split concerning what is authorization and
when it exists.
Many cases have involved situations in which the security
agreement either specifically prohibited the sale of collateral or
required the prior written consent of the secured party; the debtor
sold covered collateral in the past; and the lender knew of the
debtor's prior sales, but made no objection to those sales and
accepted either checks made out to the debtor and endorsed by the
debtor to the lender or took the debtor's checks. Some courts in
these circumstances have construed the prohibition literally and
109. See id. § 9-307(1).
110. Id. § 9-306(2) (emphasis added).
11. But see Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat'l Bank, 426 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1970) (security
agreement contained power of sale clause).
112. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
113. See, e.g., In re Coast Trading Co., 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1753 (D. Or. 1983)
(secured party did not waive its security interest in wheat by permitting debtor to sell the collateral
without obtaining the written consent of the secured party as required by the security agreement
even though the debtor for the past 18 years sold the collateral without getting written consent
because the debtor and the secured party had an understanding that the proceeds of such sales would
always be turned over to the secured party; National Livestock Credit Corp. v. Schultz, 34 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 317 (Okla. 1982) (secured party waived provision of security agreement,
which required the buyer of cattle to pay secured party and debtor jointly, by failing to object to the
debtor's practice of accepting checks payable only to it and either remitting check to secured party or
issuinga ditlcrent check to the secured party).

114. See, e.g., Anon, Inc., v. Farmers Prod. Credit Ass'n, __ Ind. __
, 446 N.E.2d 656
(1983) (secured party not estopped from asserting its rights under a security agreement against the
purchaser of collateral where the buyer could not show detrimental reliance).
115. See, e.g., Citizens Savings Bank v. Sac City State Bank, 315 N.W.2d 20 (Iowa 1982) (prior
course of dealing may overcome express terms in a security agreement and constitute consent or
authorization for a sale of collateral free of liens).
116. See Benson County Coop. Credit Union v. Central Livestock Ass'n, Inc., 300 N.W. 2(1236
(N.D. 1980) (whether secured party waived requirement of written consent by knowingly allowing
debtor to sell a portion of the assets securing a loan was a question of fact); Mammoth Cave Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. Oldham, 569 S.W.2d 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (case remanded to trial court for
clarification of whether secured party authorized the sale of tobacco).
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held that the sale of the collateral was unauthorized because the
security agreement had an express prohibition against sales." 7
Other courts have held that no authorized sale can exist absent
written consent. I" A number of courts on the above facts, however,
have held for the purchaser on the theory that the sale, in which the
debtor does not remit the proceeds, was authorized by the prior
course of dealing. " 9 Some courts have rejected this approach 20 and
have criticized those who ignore section 1-205(4), which provides:
The express terms of an agreement and an applicable
course of dealing or usage of trade shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
when such construction is unreasonable express terms
control both course of dealing and usage of trade and
course of dealing controls usage of trade.' 2'
117. See, e.g., North Central Kansas Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 223 Kan.
689, 577 P.2d 35 (1978) (creditor did not waive consent requirement by failing to remonstrate with
debtor following debtor's unauthorized sale of collateral); Wabasso State Bank v. Caldwell Parking
Co., 308 Minn. 349, 251 N.W.2d 321 (1976) (secured party, under agreement which prohibited sale
of collateral without secured party's written approval, did not authorize debtor to sell collateral by
not objecting to course of dealing in which borrower previously sold collateral without consent);
Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971) (creditor's failure
to object to debtor's sale of collateral did not alone equal written consent to dispose of collateral).
118. See, e.g., Oxford Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Dye, 368 So.2d 241 (Miss. 1979) (absent evidence of
written consent, creditor's acquiesence in the sale of encumbered assets did not constitute waiver of
written consent requirement); First Nat'l Bank v. Calvin Pickle Co., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1245, rev'don other grounds, 516 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1973) (to extinguish creditor's possessory
rights in collateral, creditor must consent in writing to debtor's sale of collateral regardless of
whether creditor establishes custom of allowing debtor to sell collateral without written consent upon
debtor's promise to pay over sale proceeds).
119. See, e.g., Planters Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Bowles, 256 Ark. 1063, 511 S.W.2d 645 (1974)
(Arkansas legislature responded by amending S 9-306(2) to eliminate course of dealing
authorizations); Hedrick Savings Bank v. Myers, 229 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1975) (prior course of
dealing may constitute authority to sell pledged collateral under S 9-306(2)); Clovis Nat'l Bank v.
Thomas, 425 P.2d 726 (N.M. 1967) (legislature amended S 9-306(2) to read "a security interest in
farm products and the proceeds thereof shall not be considered waived by the secured party by any
course of dealing between the parties or by any trade usage"); National Livestock Credit Corp. v.
Schultz, 653 P.2d 1243 (Okla. App. 1982) (creditor's long-term course of conduct allowing debtor to
disregard written consent requirement in security agreement was a waiver of that requirement). But
c. United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971). In Hext the defendant, Walter Hext, was a
cotton farmer and was also the sole owner of a cotton ginning business. Id. at 806. In 1962 the
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) loaned Hext $38,720 to finance his farming operation,
taking back a chattel mortgage in Hext's forthcoming cotton crop. Id. FmHA was aware at the time
of the loan that the cotton would be ginned and marketed by Hext through his own ginning
company. Id. The court held that FmHA took a security interest in goods as farm products, knowing
that Hext was capable of transferring them into the category of inventory and selling them in the
ordinary course of business, and therefore the buyers of the cotton took free of the security interest.
Id. at 814.
120. See, e.g., North Central Kansas Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 223 Kan.
689, 577 P.2d 35 (1978) (creditor did not waive consent requirement by failing to remonstrate with
debtor following debtor's unauthorized sale of collateral); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 584 S.W.2d
515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (creditor's prior course of conduct allowing debtor to sell collateral
without creditor's written consent was not a waiver of written consent requirement); Southwest
Wash. Prod. Credit. Ass'n. v. Seattle-First Nat'l, 19 Wash. App. 397, 577 P.2d 589 (1978) (prior
course of dealing without more does not constitute a waiver of security agreement term requiring
written consent prior to sale ofcollateral).
121. U.C.C. S 1-205(4)(1978).
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Even courts rejecting the prior course of dealing rationale have
apparently concluded that a course of performance or showing of
acquiescence to the sale after the execution of the security
22
agreement can establish a waiver of the security interest. 1
An interesting and instructive case is North Central Production
Credit Association v. Washington Sales Co. 123 In Washington Sales a
farmer granted a security interest to North Central Production
Credit Association (PCA) in his cows, crops, and milk. 12 4 PCA
filed the proper financing statement in the appropriate place and,
12 5
therefore, PCA perfected its security interest in the collateral.
The security agreement contained the following provision:
The Debtor. . . will not. . . dispose of [the property
described] without the written consent of the Secured
Party; however, permission is granted for the Debtor to
sell the property described herein for the fair market value
thereof, providing that paymentfor the same is madejointly to the
Debtor and the Secured Party.... 126
The farmer sold wheat twice to the local elevator, receiving
from the elevator checks made payable only to him. 127 The farmer
deposited one of the checks in his own account and wrote PCA a
personal check for the amount of the sale. 128 He endorsed the other
check to PCA.1 29 The farmer also sold a total of thirty-five head of
cattle, at separate times over a one-year period, which he did not
report to PCA and for which he did not remit the proceeds. 130 The
sale of cattle that caused the litigation was transacted through the
Washington Sales Company.1 31 It was clear that neither the sales
company nor the buyers of the cattle had actual knowledge of
PCA's security interest.1 3 2 They were, however, on constructive
122. See Southwest Wash. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Seattle-First Nat'l, 19 Wash. App. 397,
577 P.2d 589 (1978). The court stated that "any course of performance... . or other conduct subsequent
to the agreement can amount to a waiver." Id. at 593 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
123. 223 Kan. 689, 577 P.2d 35 (1978).
124. North Central Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 223 Kan. 689, 690, 577 P.2d
35, 36 (1978).
125. Id. PCA filed the financing statement with the register of deeds. Id.
126. Id. (emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 691, 577 P.2d at 37.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 691-92, 577 P.2d at 37-38. The president of Washington Sales Co. testified that he
had no knowledge of PCA's lien and that he was not told of PCA's lien by the farmer when the cattle
were sold. Id. at 691-92, 577 P.2d at 37. The president of Washington Sales Co. knew, however, that
financing statements on cattle were recorded in the register of deeds but stated that he never checked
die ret'ords when cattle were sold at his sales barn. Id.
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notice of PCA's security interest because PCA had properly filed
the financing statement in the appropriate place. 133
Although the Kansas Supreme Court held for the buyer, it
made several conclusions favoring creditors. First, it determined
that a security agreement clause, authorizing the farmer to sell the
collateral with prior written consent or permitting a sale if the
payment for the collateral was made jointly to the farmer, did not
amount to a waiver of PCA's security interest and was not a
consent to the sale in violation of the express terms of the
agreement.1 34 Also, PCA's conduct did not amount to an implied
consent to the sale of the livestock. 35 Third, PCA's past conduct
did not amount to a course of dealing that showed it impliedly
waived its security interest.1 3 6 Then, turning to the notice filing
concept of the Code, the court stated that the equitable doctrine of
waiver is not available to a buyer who has constructive notice of a
lien and does not check the public records, which are in part
maintained for a buyer's protection. 137 Thus, the case is a strong
creditor case concerning what constitutes implied consent and past
course of conduct.
Yet, the court held that PCA relinquished its security interest.
The basis for this decision was the testimony of the president of
PCA, which established that PCA told the farmer he could sell the
cattle provided he remitted the proceeds or had the check made
jointly payable.1 38 The fact that the farmer could sell the cattle
provided he remitted the proceeds was considered by the court to be
an express consent to the sale and cut off PCA's security interest. 139
PCA never warned or reminded the farmer that taking payment in
133. Id. at 693, 577 P.2d at 38.
134. Id. at 693-94, 577 P.2 at 39.
135. Id. at 697, 577 P.2d at 41.
136. Id. The court determined that for a waiver to exist, the party must have "voluntarily and
intentionally renounced or given up a known right, or. . . caused or done some positive act or
positive inaction which is inconsistent with the contractual right." Id. (citations omitted). The court,
using this test, determined that the actions of PCA in accepting several payments could not be
construed as a "voluntary and intentional renouncement" of its security interest in the collateral. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. The president of PCA, James D. Ganson, testified at the lower court hearing in part as
follows:
Q. Did you, Mr. Ganson, ever have any conversation at all with Mr. Uffman
regarding his not selling cattle?
A. We told him he could sell cattle providing he applied the proceeds from that sale or
had the check made jointly.
Q. When was he told that, sir?
A. He was told at the beginning of the loan when Mr. Rightmeier was out there, and I
can remember visiting with him in that regard on one of my visits out there.
139. Id. at 697-98, 577 P.2d at 41.
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his name only was a violation of the express terms of the security
agreement.
One of the strongest cases for lenders is Garden City Production
Credit Association v. Lannan.140 In Lannan Murlin and Doris Carter
obtained a loan from Garden City Production Credit Association
(PCA) and signed a security agreement that prohibited the sale of
Carter's cattle without PCA's prior written consent. 14 1 Yet, the
Carters sold cattle at various times without obtaining the necessary
written permission. PCA knew about the prior sales but made no
objections and accepted the checks that the Carters endorsed over
to it.142 This case arose when the Carters sold 161 head of cattle,
with PCA's knowledge, to Western Cattle Company (Western), a
large livestock brokerage firm operating primarily in Kansas.
Western negotiated a contract between Carter and Augustin
Brothers, of Nebraska, who in turn sold the cattle to the defendant,
Lannan, a farmer in Nebraska. 4 3 Western issued a sight draft for
the cattle payable to Carter. Carter endorsed the draft over to PCA
and PCA sent the draft through the regular banking channels for
collection. Approximately two weeks later, PCA learned that the
draft was being returned for insufficient funds. 14 4 At this point,
PCA recorded its financing statement in Nebraska, thus perfecting
its security interest in the cattle pursuant to the Uniform
Commercial Code, and made a demand for the cattle. 14 5 The
district court found that PCA had knowledge of the proposed sale,
failed to rebuke or object to the sale, and therefore, had waived its
140. 186 Neb. 668, 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971).
141. Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 669, 186 N.W.2d 99, 100-01
(1971).
142. Id. at 670, 186 N.W.2d at 101. Carter had never requested written consent to sell cattle nor
had PCA ever rebuked Carter for failure to secure the written consent. Id.
143. Id. Carter informed PCA of the intended sale three months before the sale. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. Section 9-103(1)(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides for the perfection of
security interests in multiple state transactions. This section provides:
When collateral is brought into and kept in this state while subject to a security
interest perfected under the law of the jurisdiction from which the collateral was
removed, the security interest remains perfected, but if action is required by Part 3 of
this Article to perfect the security interest,
(i) if the action is not taken before the expiration of the period of perfection
in the other jurisdiction or the end of four months after the collateral is brought
into this state, whichever period first expires, the security interest becomes
unperfected at the end of that period and is thereafter deemed to have been
unperfected as against a person who became a purchaser after removal;
(ii) if the action is taken before the expiration of the period specified in
subparagraph (i), the security interest continues perfected thereafter;
(iii) for the purpose of priority over a buyer of consumer goods (subsection
(2) of Section 9-307), the period of the effectiveness ofa filing in thejurisdiction
from which the collateral is removed is governed by the rules with respect to
perfection in subparagraphs (i) and (ii).
U.C.C.

9-103(l)(d) (1978).
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security interest in the cattle.' 46 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska held that PCA did not waive its perfected security
interest in the cattle.14 7 The court relied upon section 9-307(1) of
the Code and gave literal effect to the prohibition in the PCA
4 8
security agreement against sale without prior written consent. 1
This case illustrates the harshest effect of section 9-307(1) in
that Lannan was really powerless to protect himself. If he checked
the financing statements he would not have found PCA's interest
because PCA did not file in Nebraska until after Lannan purchased
the cattle. PCA filed in Nebraska immediately upon learning where
the cattle were located. Also, what rancher would think it had to
check the records when it was buying from either a cattle trader or
another cattle feeder? An interesting twist in this case was that
Lannan, a cattle operator, bought the cattle from a seller who
purchased the cattle with a draft that was not honored.

4

9

It is

unfortunate that the court was not confronted with an argument
that section 2-403(1)(b) of the Code gave Lannan's seller the ability
50
to pass better title than he had.1

While many section 9-307(1) cases involve suits against
buyers, the farm products rule applies to auctioneers as well as
purchasers in many states. Thus, a court may hold an auctioneer or
commission agent liable for conversion when the secured party has
not authorized the sale. 151

A major problem for the secured party is that in reality it must
expect and want the debtor to sell collateral to make payments on
146. 186 Neb. at 671, 186 N.W.2d at I01.
147. Id. at 676, 186 N.W.2d at 104. The court stated that "in order to establish a waiver oflegal
right there must be a clear, unequivocal and decisive act of a party showing such a purpose, or acts to
an estoppel on his part." Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 671, 186 N.W.2dat 101.
150. See U.C.C. 5 2-403(l)(b) (1978). Section 2-403(1)(b) provides:
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent
of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title
to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a
transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored....
Id.
151. See, e.g., Duvall-Wheeler Livestock Barn v. United States, 415 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1969)
(auctioneers held liable in conversion when livestock was sold at public auction in disregard of the
Government's recorded bills of sale); United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Supp.
944 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (auctioneer who sold livestock in which the Government held a security interest
was liable in conversion notwithstanding its want of any knowledge of the Government's security
interest); North Central Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 223 Kan. 689, 577 P.2d 35
(1978) (an agent who received property from his principal, sold it under the principal's instructions,
and paid the proceeds to the principal was liable for conversion when the principal had no right to
sell the property).
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the outstanding debt. Obviously, if the secured party gives a
blanket consent to sales, it will lose its security in the collateral upon
sale and the right to seek redress from the purchaser should the
debtor default. Recognizing this, lenders have attempted to protect
themselves by giving conditioned authorizations. Courts have
upheld some conditional authorizations as valid and concluded that
the secured party, by allowing sales in this manner, has not waived
its security interest. Examples of valid conditions are authorization
1 52
to sell if payment is made jointly to seller and secured party;
authorization to sell conditioned upon whether buyer's drafts
153 and consent to
drawn on defendant bank were honored and15paid;
4
sell so long as no prior default had occurred.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
rejected a conditional authorization argument in First NationalBank
& Trust Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. 155 In Iowa Beef Iowa Beef
Processors (IBP) bought, without checking the records, cattle that
were subject to a perfected security interest. 156 Although the court
noted that the buyer of farm products had the burden of checking to
see whether the farm products were subject to a perfected security
interest, it concluded that IBP's failure to check the records was
irrelevant because the secured party gave the debtor actual
authority to sell the collateral, irrespective of whether that consent
was communicated to IBP. 157 The secured party argued that it did
not consent to the sale inasmuch as the debtor did not remit the
proceeds of the sale and the consent to allow the debtor to sell in his
own name was conditioned upon the debtor remitting the proceeds
by his own check. 158 The court rejected this argument, stating: "A
secured party has an interest in protecting its security by
conditioning its consent, but it can place conditions that would
afford it protection without great unfairness to the good faith
purchaser."' 15 9 The court appeared to distinguish the conditional
152. See, e.g., North Central Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 223 Kan. 689, 577
P.2d 35 (1978) (security agreement condition authorizing sales of collateral if payment is made
jointly to the debtor and the secured party is permissible).
153. See, e.g., Baker Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Long Creek Meat Co., 226 Or. 643, 513 P.2d 1129
(1973) (authorization to sell collateral conditioned upon payment of dishonored drafts is not
prohibited under the Uniform Commercial Code).
154. See, e.g., Farmers State Bank v. Edison Non-Stock Coop. Ass'n, 190 Neb. 789, 212
N.W.2d 625 (1973) (authorization to sell upon condition that no event of default had occurred is
permissible).
155. 626 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1980).
156. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 626 F.2d 764, 766 (10th Cir.
1980).
157. Id. at 768.
158 Id. at 767.
159. Id. at 769.
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authorization cases by noting that in those cases the condition was
discoverable prior to the sale or the condition was within the
control of the buyer. 160 It must be emphasized that First National's
16 1
security agreement did not require prior written consent.
Interestingly, the court was not impressed with the fact that if IBP
had checked the records, it would have known about First
1 62
National's security interest.

Another current issue related to sections 9-307(1) and 9-306(2)
is the use of the so-called borrowers lists. Many elevators and other
purchasers of large quantities of grain or livestock have directly
contacted large lenders who might be financing producers in their
area, asking them to furnish a list of all borrowers in whose crops or
livestock the lender claims an interest. This has presented some
practical problems for lenders. On the one hand, the lender does
not want to be uncooperative and is probably tempted to believe
that direct notification may well be the most effective way of
assuring that its security interest is noted by the purchasers. On the
other hand, the lender must be concerned about such questions as:
1) will this violate any confidence on the part of a borrower; 2) will
furnishing the list obligate the lender to update the lists; 3) will the
unintentional omission of a debtor preclude the lender from
asserting its properly perfected security interest against a purchaser
if the lender has otherwise not consented or waived its interest.
A recent case dealing with this last question is United States v.
Riceland Foods, Inc. 163 The court in Riceland Foods concluded that
when both the "borrowers list" and a letter transmitted with the
list include a statement that the list is supplied as a convenience and
is not necessarily complete, a purchaser receiving these documents
cannot rely on the list.164 Rather, to be completely protected, the

purchaser must check the appropriate records. 165 In other words,
the purchaser or third party will still be subject to a perfected
security holder even though the seller-debtor was not on the list
when a perfected secured party is involved.
160. See id. The court stated that consent allowing the debtor to sell in its own name, provided
the debtor remits by its own check, makes the buyer an insurer of acts beyond its control. Id. Such an
arrangement is not a "true conditional sales authorization." Id.
161. See id. at 768. In fact, the security agreement made no reference at all to sales of collateral.

Id.
162. Id.
163. 504 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
164. United States v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (E.D. Ark. 1981). Because
the letter stated that the list was not necessarily complete, it was not reasonable for the purchaser of
crops subject to a security interest to rely on the ''borrowers list." Id.
165. Id.
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METHODS TO DEAL WITH THE RULE

Notwithstanding the farm products rule, buyers can adopt
procedures that will minimize their risk. For example, the buyer
can search the appropriate financing statement records. This
procedure is particularly onerous when local filing is involved 166 or
when a livestock operator is buying livestock in a number of states.
Yet, business practices could be adjusted to give the buyer time to
check the records. People argue competition will not permit this. If
everyone followed this practice, however, this would not be a
problem. A buyer may also obtain borrowers lists from local
lenders. This will not relieve a buyer of the responsibility of
checking the records, 167 but it will help buyers know who some of
the borrowers are. If the buyer knows a lender has a security
interest, it should determine if a joint payee check is to be issued.
The sellers should be informed of the buyer's policy and the reasons
for it. Another possibility is for buyers not to buy farm products
from unfamiliar producers or truckers. 168 Buyers not covered by
the Packers & Stockyard Act prompt payment rule1 69 could pay
166. Many local filing officers will not provide the information by phone. Written requests
sometimes take as long as two weeks. It may be the same situation if central filing is involved.
Remember, if crops are involved, the debtor's residence and the county where the land is located
must be checked. See U.C.C. 5 9-401(1) (1978).
167. See United States v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
168. For an interesting case involving a trucker who sold a load of beans he was trucking without
permission of the owner, see Simonds-Shields-Theis Grain Co. v. Far-Mar Co., 575 F. Supp. 290
(W.D. Mo. 1983) (farmer could not recover from the buyer).
169. See 7 U.S.C. S 228b (1982). Section 228b provides:
(a) Each packer, market agency, or dealer purchasing livestock shall, before the
close of the next business day following the purchase of livestock and transfer of
possession thereof, deliver to the seller or his duly authorized representative the full
amount of the purchase price: Provided, That each packer, market agency, or dealer
purchasing livestock for slaughter shall, before the close of the next business day
following purchase of livestock and transfer of possession thereof, actually deliver at
the point of transfer of possession to the seller or his duly authorized representative a
check or shall wire transfer funds to the seller's account for the full amount of the
purchase price; or, in the case of a purchase on a carcass or "grade and yield" basis,
the purchaser shall make payment by check at the point of transfer of possession or
shall wire transfer funds to the seller's account for the full amount of the purchase price
not later than the close of the first business day following determination of the
purchase price: Providedfurther, That if the seller or his duly authorized representative
is not present to receive payment at the point of transfer of possession, as herein
provided, the packer, market agency or dealer shall wire transfer funds or place a
check in the United States mail for the full amount of the purchase price, properly
addressed to the seller, within the time limits specified in this subsection, such action
being deemed compliance with the requirement for prompt payment.
(b) Noiwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section and subject to
such terms and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe, the parties to the purchase
and sale of livestock may expressly agree in writing, before such purchase or sale, to
effect payment in a manner other than that required in subsection (a) of this section.
Any such agreement shall be disclosed in the records of any market agency or dealer
selling the livestock, and in the purchaser's records and on the accounts or other
documents issued by the purchaser related to the transaction.
(c) Any delay or attempt to delay by a market agency, dealer, or packer
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subsequent to checking the records. This may be a major problem,
however, if it takes a long time to determine if a security interest is
involved. 170 In any event, purchasers should seriously consider
obtaining insurance, which appears to be readily available.
When a buyer is sued by a secured party, it may have a valid
defense. For example, the goods may not be farm products, the
lender may not have a perfected security interest, or the lender may
have authorized the sale. If the purchaser must pay twice, it always
has a claim against its seller under section 2-312 of the Code for
breach of a warranty of title. 17 This is probably not much
protection when the farmer is already in default.
The secured party, who wants to utilize the special rule, must
have a perfected security interest. The secured party should supply
purchasers in its area with a list of borrowers making the
appropriate caveats indicating that it is not necessarily a complete
list and is supplied only for the buyer's convenience. The lender
should make sure its borrowers know about the list and the reasons
for the list before it is released. The security agreement should
contain a specific provision concerning the sale of farm products,
which the lender should rigidly follow. The agreement should also
provide when sales are allowed and make clear how the buyer is to
pay. For example, if all sales by a debtor are to be for cash only, the
agreement should specify whether the buyer is to make the lender
the sole payee or a joint payee on remittances and checks and
whether the buyer is to send them directly to the lender.
purchasing livestock, the collection of funds as herein provided, or otherwise for the
purpose of or resulting in extending the normal period of payment for such livestock
shall be considered an "unfair practice" in violation of this chapter. Nothing in this
section shall be deemed to limit the meaning of the term "unfair practice" as used in
this chapter.
Id. (emphasis in original).
170. See supra note 166 for a discussion of the delays involved in determining the existence of a
security interest.
171. See U.C.C. 5 2-312 (1978). Section 2-312 provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller
that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other lien or
encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of contracting has no
knowledge.
(2) A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only by specific
language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that the person
selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such right or
title as he or a third person may have.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods
of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any
third person by way of infringement or the like but a buyer who furnishes
specifications to the seller must hold the seller harmless against any such claim which
arises out of compliance with the specifications.
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B. LEGISLATIVE REACTIONS TO U.C.C. § 9-307(1)
State legislatures have reacted in a variety of ways to the
litigation and controversy generated by the farm products rule.
California has eliminated the rule. 172 Arguably, California is not an
appropriate benchmark. Unlike many states, California has
relatively few buyers of crops such as vegetables, grains, nuts, and
fruit, and many of its farmers are members of cooperatives that
have mandatory marketing contracts requiring that all
commodities be sold to the cooperative. Moreover, many lenders
will not extend credit unless the debtor, prior to planting, has a
buyer committed to buy the crop at harvest. Lenders also obtain a
written assignment of the crop proceeds from the farmer, which
authorizes the buyer to make direct payment to the lender.
Normally, the lender forwards the crop assignment to the buyer
who acknowledges it and agrees to send the crop proceeds directly
to the lender in an amount stipulated in the assignment.
Other states have modified section 9-307(1).173 Some states
have required the farmer to submit a list of potential buyers to the
lender who must notify these buyers. If the buyers are notified, they
must write a joint payee check unless otherwise directed. 174 In Ohio
and Indiana, the farmer is required to furnish a list of buyers to the
secured party and cannot sell to someone not on the list without
being guilty of a crime.' 7 5 The Delaware version of 9-307(1)
provides that if a grain buyer registers with the secretary of state,
the buyer will take free of a perfected security interest unless it
receives written notice within one year of the sale. 176 Under the
Delaware system, the secured party can determine who the
potential buyers are. This is not the case in Kentucky, where
172. See CAL. COM. CODE S 9307(1) (West Supp. 1984). The California version of 5 9-307(l) of
the Uniform Commercial Code provides: "A buyer in the ordinary course of business (subdivision
(9) of Section 1201) takes free of a security interest created by'his seller even though the security
interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence." Id.
173. FIo exanple, Kansas excludes milk, cream, and eggs fro m the definition of tarm products.
KAN. STAT. ANN. S 84-9-307(1) (1983). Oklahoma has changed the rule so it only applies to "a
person buying livestock from a person engaged in farming or ranching operations ....
A merchant
purchasing or a commission agent selling farm products other than livestock must obtain a certificate
from the seller listing security interest holders. The certificate shall indicate the security interest
holders because it is a felony to give false information. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A 5 9-307(1), (3)
(West Supp. 1983). Oregon and Montana have special rules for livestock. OR. REV. STAT. § 79.3070
(1981); MONT. CODE ANN. S 81-8-301 (1983). Other states have exempted commission merchants.
See, e.g., GA. CODE 109A-9-307(1)(Supp. 1982).
174. Ohio is an example of this. For a discussion of Ohio's law, see Note, H.291: Ohio's Attempt
h, R1rdy Problemis qf Security Interests in Form Products Under the UCC, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV.__
(1984).
175. See IND. CODE ANN. S 26-1-9-307 (Burns Supp. 1983); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26
(Page Interim Supp. 1983).
7
176. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, S 9-30 (2) (Supp. 1983).
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duly licensed tobacco warehouses, grain storage warehouses,
stockyards, and race horse auctions take free of a perfected security
interest unless the secured party gave them written notice of the
security interest. 177 The statute has no mechanism for secured
parties to determine who the potential buyers are. 78 The Kentucky
approach seems to have effectively repealed section 9-307(1).
Under this approach there is no effective way that secured parties
can determine who the buyers are and who should be given the
written notice. This approach completely ignores the notice
function that filed financing statements have under the Code.
Irrespective of one's position regarding the proper function of
section 9-307(1), it is possible under the Code for the buyers of farm
products to determine who the secured party is by checking the
filed financing statement.
North Dakota has perhaps the strangest version of section 9307.1 79 The merchant-buyer or the commission merchant selling
177. See Ky. REV. STAT. 5 355.9-307 (Supp. 1982).
178. Id.
179. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-09-28 (1983). Section 41-09-28 provides:
1. A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection 9 of section 41-01-11) other than
a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes
free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is
perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
2. In the case ofconsumer goods, a buyer takes free ofa security interest even though
perfected ifhe buys without knowledge of the security interest, for value and for his
own personal, family or household purposes or his own farming operations unless
prior to the purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement covering
such goods.
3. A buyer other than a buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection 1 of this
section) takes free of a security interest to the extent that it secures future advances
made after the secured party acquires knowledge of the purchase, or more than
forty-five days after the purchase, whichever first occurs, unless made pursuant to
a commitment entered into without knowledge of the purchase and before the
expiration of the forty-five-day period.
4. Before a merchant who purchases or a commission merchant who sells farm
products for another for a fee or commission issues a check or draft to the seller in
payment for farm products, the merchant must require the seller to execute a
certificate of ownership, on the form as prescribed by the commissioner of
agriculture, disclosing the names, social security numbers, addresses and home
counties of the owners for five years prior thereto, the county of location of the
property prior to the sale, and the names of the parties to whom security interests
have been given against the farm products or representing that security interests do
not exist. The merchant is required to enter on the check or draft the name of the
secured party disclosed in the certificate, or actually known by the merchant at the
time, as payee with the seller. The certificate must include a warning to the seller
that an untrue statement as to any portion of the certificate constitutes a class C
felony if the value of the property exceeds five hundred dollars, or a class A
misdemeanor if the property does not exceed five hundred dollars in value.
5. A lender who relies upon a security interest shall advise the borrower at the time
the loan is made that the law requires the borrower to disclose to the purchasers or
merchants of the collateral the names of the secured parties, and that the
purchasers or commission merchants are required to enter the names of the
secured parties on the check or draft issues in payment for the farm products, and
that failure to make the disclosure will constitute a crime.
6. A lender shall make a good faith effort against the borrower of funds, where farm
products are used as collateral, for collection of any loss sustained by the lender
through the transaction, before the lender pursues collection from the merchant.
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farm products must, before issuing a check, obtain from the seller a
certificate of ownership "disclosing the names, social security
numbers, addresses and home counties of the owners for five years
prior thereto, the county of location of the property prior to sale
and the names of parties to whom security interests have been
given. . . or representing that security interests do not exist." 1 80
The certificate must include a warning that false statements
constitute a Class C felony if the value of the property sold is over
$500.181 If a secured party is involved, the buyer must make the
check jointly payable. In addition, the statute requires the lender to
advise the borrower of this crime at the time a loan is made.1 8 2 The
strange part is that when the farmer-rancher discloses no security
interest, the buyer or commission merchant must obtain a
statement from the appropriate filing officer that no financing
statement has been filed if it wants to take free of a perfected
security interest that the debtor did not disclose.1 83 Also, the
1 84
merchant loses if it has actual knowledge of a security interest.
Of import is that the knowledge requirement does not refer to a
8 5
perfected security interest. 1
As of the fall of 1983, at least sixteen states had changed
7. A merchant who purchases from or a commission merchant who sells farm
products for another for a fee or commission takes free of security interest created
by the seller if:
a. The merchant has complied with the requirements of subsection 4;
b. In the case where the seller disclosed no security interests, the merchant has
requested information from the register of deeds in the counties of the sellers'
residences over the five years prior thereto, as disclosed in the certificate, (or
from the office of secretary of state if section 41-09-40 provides for filing in that
office) as to the existence of financing statements naming the seller, and has
received from the filing officer a certificate verifying disclosures obtained by
such inquiry, and-has entered on the check or draft the names of any secured
parties named in the certificate as payee with the seller;
c. The merchant does not have actual knowledge at the time of transaction of the
existence of security interests; and
d. The merchant maintains records of such actions to support any criminal
proceedings against the seller for violation of section 12.1-23-08.
8. In order to comply with the provisions of subsection 7, inquiry need not be made of
the register of deeds office one year after the effective date of the Act which
provides for filing in the office of the secretary of state. Certified copies of security
documents filed with the register of deeds may be filed with the secretary of state
and the priority of filing of such documents will be based on the original filing date
with the register of deeds.
Id.
180. Id. S 41-09-28 (4).
181. Id.
182. Id. S 41-09-28(5).
183. Id. S 41-09-28(7)(b).
184. Id. § 41-09-28(7)(c).
185. Id. S 41-09-28(7). Cf U.C.C. §§ 9-301(l)(c) (1978) (unperfected secured creditor's interest
issubordinated to the rights of a buyer of farm products in ordinary course of business to the extent
the buyer gives value and takes delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest);
9-307(1) (purchaser of farm products in ordinary course of business does not take free of a perfected
security interest).
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section 9-307(1) in some manner.81 6 This, coupled with the strong
push of the livestock industry, apparently prompted legislators to
introduce bills in the United States Senate and House of
Representatives to federally repeal the farm products portion of 9
307(1).187

With some understanding of the farm products rule and the
reactions of courts and legislatures to it, it is appropriate to consider
briefly the validity of the rule and who should evaluate its efficacy
and desirability. This will be the focus of the remaining portion of
this Article.
C.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE FARM PRODUCTS RULE

A number of arguments have been advanced for not changing
the farm products rule. Some parties have argued that buyers from
farmers should be treated differently because farmers sell their
products through agents or sell to financially sophisticated
buyers."" These business operators are, or should be, aware of the
need to check the readily available filed financing statements,
which is not the case with most other buyers. Another consideration
is that many farm and ranch operations are cyclical in nature and
there is no steady flow of income. Most of the products come into
186. The following states have modified 5 9-307(1): Arkansas (9-306(2)), California, Delaware,
(c(i., Illinois (9-205.1, 9.301.01-.02, 9-307),
liiana, Kansas, Kcntukv. Nchraska. New
Nlexii( . North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Orctgon. South l)akota, an( Tcnticsse. AI.o sc"spra
notes 172-79.
187. See S.2190, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONg. REC. 16,953 (1983) (attempt to amend the
Agriculture & Food Act of 1981); H.R. 3296, 3297, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cone. REC. 10, 583
(1983). The House Bills were the subject of an exploratory hearing. See Problems Relating to Purchaseqf
MortgagedAgricultural Commodities.- Hearingon H. R. 3295 and H. R. 3297 Before the Subcomm. on Livestock,
Dairy and Poultry of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 98th Cong., 1 st Sess. (Nov. 16, 1983).
188. See generally Hawkland, The ProposedAmendments to Article 9 of the U. C.C. - Part I: Financing
/h lIarmeur, 76 Co5MM. L.J. 416 (1971). Secaol 2 G.
iSoK. SC:Riis
i,
In'rFREsIS iN 'ERssNAL
PR( i sRIN
§ 26.10, at 707 (1965). (ilinorc iiaile IIt
oilistt'. tiin ilb(ili IIwiig
i IIir in(hiis
odu
rule:
There may seem to be a formal resemblance between the situation of the business
which holds goods for sale as inventory and that of a farmer or stockman who raises
and sells crops or livestock. If the ordinary buyer takes free of a perfected security
interest in the inventory case, he should, it would seem, take free in the farm products
case. Yet, rightly or wrongly, and for reasons that are never precisely articulated, the
agricultural financer comes off much better than the inventory financer. There has
been, it should be added, a meager harvest of litigation in recent years, but decision,
whenever the issue has been raised, has gone for the crop or livestock mortgage against
the good faith buyer. Perhaps a small country bank holding a small country mortgage
makes a more appealing plaintiff than a national finance company doing a multimillion dollar business in inventory financing; but in fact these (lays the mortgagee is
apt to be one of the many agencies of the United States which dabble in farm credit
business. Or it may be that a buyer who is a large cannery or agricultural cooperative
- in any case a professional who knows the facts of life - makes a less appealing
defendant than the untutored consumer who is the chief beneficiary of the inventory
rule.
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existence at one time of the year and often are sold in a large unit.
Farm lenders recognize this and generally expect payments only
when products are sold. Thus, the lender has all its expectations
and security tied up in one asset. Some parties have argued that this
189
is like a bulk sale and deserves to be treated differently.
Another argument for the preservation of the rule is that it
protects the federal government, which is a large lender through the
Farmers Home Administration' and the Commodity Credit
Corporation. The 1971 Final Report of the Review Committee for
Article 9 stated: "The federal government, an important farm
lender... insists on the preservation of its security interest on farm
products as against buyers or auctioneers, in reliance on a federal
rule independent of the state rule embodied in Section 9307(1)."190 No special federal rule, however, exists today. In United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 191 the United States Supreme Court
considered whether contractual liens arising from certain federal
loan programs take precedence over private liens, absent a federal
statute to the contrary.192 A unanimous Court held that federal law
controlled the federal government's priority rights and, absent
federal legislation, courts must determine the relative priority of
private liens and consensual security interests on personal property
arising from Small Business Administration and the Farmers
1 93
Home Administration loans under nondiscriminatory state law.
Thus, the same priority rules found in the Code apply to private as
well as to federal security interests.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See U.C.C. art. 6 (1978) (bulk transfers).
U .C.C. app. II, at 881 (1978) (comments ofthe Review Committee for Article 9).
440 U.S. 715 (1979).
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 718 (1979).
Id. at 740. The United States Supreme Court noted:

To resolve this question, we must decide first whether federal or state law governs the
controversies; and second, if federal law applies, whether this Court should fashion a
uniform priority rule or incorporate state commercial law. We conclude that the
source of law is federal, but that a national rule is unnecessary to protect the federal
interests underlying the loan programs. Accordingly, we adopt state law as the
appropriate federal rule for establishing the relative priority of these competing federal
and private liens.

Id. at 718. The Court continued by stating:
Undoubtedly, federal programs that "by their nature are and must be uniform in
character throughout the Nation" necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules.
• . . Conversely, when there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law, state
law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision. Apart from considerations of
uniformity, we must also determine whether application of state law would frustrate
specific objectives of the federal programs. If so, we must fashion special rules
solicitous of those federal interests. Finally, our choice-of-law inquiry must consider
the extent to which application of the federal rule would disrupt commercial
relationships predicated on state law. . . . Because the state commercial codes "furnish
convenient solutions in no way inconsistent with adequate protection of the federal
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If the farm products rule were totally eliminated, the lender
would lose a substantial protection. Moreover, the lender would
have no leverage with the potential buyers concerning who the
buyer should name as payee of the check when the debtor sells
products subject to a security interest. Also, the creditor would not
be able to determine who all of the potential buyers are because
grain and livestock can be transported out of the local area without
these buyers registering with any single office.194 This is in marked
contrast to the Code notice filing system that makes it possible to
determine who might have a security interest.
Assuming that the creditor would not be able to ascertain who
the buyers are, the creditor would be unable to ensure being named
as a joint payee on the check. Thus, the creditor would have to
establish procedures to assure that the proceeds from the sale of the
covered collateral would be identifiable as required by section 9306(2). The contrast to other businesses is arguably striking. In
many other business operations, particularly dealing with
expensive goods, the proceeds will consist of chattel paper,19 5 which
is fairly easy to police and identify. For the farm lender to keep
proceeds identifiable, however, it must keep the farmer from
commingling the proceeds with other funds. This historically has
been difficult in most agricultural sales since farmers are generally
paid by check, which is deposited in a general checking account.
This can pose significant troubles for a lender because of section 9306(4)(d), which provides that, in insolvency proceedings, a party
with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected
security interest in all cash and bank accounts if the debtor
commingled the proceeds within ten days before filing the
1
bankruptcy petition.

96

interest[s]"... we decline to override intricate state laws of general applicability on
which private creditors base their daily commercial transactions.

Id. at 728-29.
194. But seeDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 5 9-307(2)'(Interim Supp. 1983) (buyer who registers with
secretary if state may purchase grain in the ordinary course of business for value free of any security
interest unless the secured creditor sends notice to the buyer within one year prior to the payment of
proceeds to the seller).
195. See U.C.C. S 9-105(l)(b). Chattel paper is defined in the Uniform Commercial Code as:
A writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security
interest in or a lease of specific goods, but a charter or other contract involving the use
or hire of a vessel is not chattel paper. When a transaction is evidenced both by such a
security agreement or a lease and by an instrument or a series of instruments, the
group of writings taken together constitutes chattel paper....
Id.
196. Id. § 9-306(4)(d). For purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code, insolvency occurs when
either the debtor ceases to pay its debts in the ordinary course of business, is unable to pay his or her
debts as they come due, or is insolvent under federal bankruptcy law. Id. S1-201(23).
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered section
9-306(4)(d) in In re Gibson Products.197 In that case, a secured party
claimed a $20,000 bank account in which only ten dollars had come
from the sale of the secured party's collateral during the ten days
prior to the bankruptcy petition. 198 The court held that under
section 9-306(4)(d) a secured party has a claim to all of the proceeds
deposited in a commingled account during the ten days preceding
bankruptcy so long as the party can show that the debtor deposited
some proceeds from the sale of its collateral in the commingled
account during the time period. 199 The court, however, allowed the
secured creditor to keep only ten dollars because the debtor had
derived the other money from the sale of collateral not covered by.
the security agreement, and therefore, the other money was.
considered a voidable preference under the old bankruptcy act
since the interest in the other money arose within ninety days of
bankruptcy. 20 0 Apparently, the same result would occur today
under the current bankruptcy law. 20 1 Moreover, the secured party
has no control over when the farmer files for bankruptcy in that no
20 2
one can file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against a farmer.
Finally, assuming that a change of section 9-307(1) would
create substantially more risk for the lender, it would appear that
the lender would loan less, require more in the way of collateral,
require guarantors, raise its charges, or combinations of these. This
could well put pressure on the federal government to get more
involved in the lending business since the Farmers Home
Administration's current requirements are that borrowers are not
eligible unless credit is otherwise not available. 20 3 Of course, there
is always the possibility of the creditor being able to obtain an
insurance policy to cover this risk.
Buyers and commission agents make many arguments
supporting their view that the rule is unjustifiable. The risk of
nonpayment has, in effect, been shifted to the buyer. The free flow
of commerce principle, which is recognized in other sections of the
Code and is the basis for the ordinary buyer taking free of a prior
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977).
In reGibson Prods., 543 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977).
543 F.2d at 657.
Id. at 656-57.
See I1 U.S.C. S 547(b), (e)(3)(1982). See also.|. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HAND3OOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 24-6, at 1012-17 (1980).
202. I1 U.S.C. § 101(l17)-(18); 303 (1982). See In reJohnson, 13 Bankr. 342, 346-47 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1981) (when court granted involuntary bankruptcy petition due to default by debtor, debtor
cannot later argue that the bankruptcy court's finding that he was not a farmer was incorrect). See
also Pearson, Is a Man Out Standing in His Field a Farmerfor Bankruptcy Purposes?,5J. Ac. TAX'N & LAW
305 (1984) (discusses who is a farmer for purposes of the federal bankruptcy code).
203. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1922, 1927, 1941 (1982).
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perfected security interest, applies to farm products as well as to the
inventory of the appliance store; farmers should be treated as any
other business. The Code has, after all, generally protected the
buyer in the ordinary course of business or the good faith
purchaser. 20 4 The lender has not lost everything because it will still
have a security interest in the proceeds. Requiring purchasers of
farm products to check the appropriate records is too costly and
impractical. Also, farmers do not tell the buyers in advance of sale
dates. This is a particular problem for the livestock industry in that
many packers buy from multistate areas and many are required to
pay before the close of the next business day. 20 5 The lenders are in a
better position to absorb the loss and, after all, it was their decision
to lend the money. Others believe this rule is particularly hard on
small buyers who do not have the profit margin and financial
resources to absorb the loss. While many have insurance, some
insurance companies are having second thoughts about writing
policies to cover these risks. Finally, the buyers complain that they
may be sued a very long time after they have purchased the farm
products subject to a perfected security interest. This is possible
because most of the claims against the buyers are based on
conversion, which is normally a tort. Consequently, the tort statute
20 6
of limitations applies.
Clearly, some state legislatures have been persuaded that the
rule is bad. As indicated previously, some states have placed the
burden on the farmer to provide a list of buyers to the lender who
must notify potential buyers. 20 7 At least two states make it a crime

204. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2) (entrusting possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
goods of the kind gives the merchant power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the
ordinary course of business); 2-702(3) (seller's right to reclaim goods sold to an insolvent buyer is
subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser); 3-305 (rights of a
holder in due course); 5-114 (issuer's duty and privilege to honor letters of credit); 6-110(2)
(purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of a defect by reason of transferee's noncompliance with the requirements of Article 6 takes free of the defect); 7-205 (buyer in the ordinary
course of business of fungible goods sold and delivered by a warehouseman who is also in the
business of buying and selling such goods takes free of any claim under a warehouse receipt even
though it has been duly negotiated); 7-502 (rights acquired by due negotiation of warehouse
receipts); 8-301 (purchaser of a security acquires the rights in the security that his transferor had or
had actual authority to convey); 8-302 (a bona ide purchaser of a security acquires the security free
of any adverse claim); 9-308 (purchaser of chattel paper who gives new value and takes possession in
the ordinary course of business has priority over a security interest in the chattel paper); 9-309
(holder in due course of a negotiable instrument and bona fide purchaser of a security take priority
over an earlier security interest even though perfected). But see id. S 7-503 (document of title confers
no right in goods against a person who before issuance of the document had a legal interest or a
perfected security interest in the goods and had not given up its interest).
205.7 U.S.C. § 228b (1982). See supra note 169 for the text of § 228b.
206. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-16 (Supp. 1983) (cause of action must be brought
within six years after the cause of action has accrued). But see IOWA CODE ANN. § 25A. 13 (West 1978)
(shortened the statute of limitations to two years).
207. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
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for the farmer to sell to anyone not on the list.208 Using the criminal
process is probably inappropriate when considering a creditor's
rights problem. Unless retribution is the major justification of the
punishment, the purpose of the punishment is lacking. Most
farmers are eternal optimists. Their motto is "wait until next year,
the yields and prices will be up. All that we need is a little time."
Also, prosecutions of this type will not be popular and jury
nullification is a real possibility.
Moreover, before the criminal process is invoked or the rule is
eliminated, central filing for financing statements covering farm
products with easy and quick access to the filed financing
statements should be tried. One state, Iowa, has used this
procedure for some time. Farm products are filed with the secretary
of state and there is a private search firm that will provide the
information immediately by phone.2 0 9 All concerned seem to be
satisfied with this practice.
Also, with the advance of the computer age, it should be easy
technically to provide in-state access to filed information through
what are called dumb terminals, or some other means. One
problem cited by opponents to the use of computer technology is
cost, but apparently, if the legislature will not siphon the revenue,
the users, those searching as well as filing, would be willing to pay
for the system.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE
BOARD OF THE CODE

PERMANENT

EDITORIAL

A critical analysis of the farm products issue is necessary, but
it should not, at least initially, occur in the political arena. The
issue must be examined in a setting in which political weight and
savvy are not of paramount importance. The Permanent Editorial
Board of the UCC is the appropriate place for this evaluation to
begin. Interestingly, the Board considered the farm products rule
in 1970-71, but none of the 1972 amendments to the Code affected
section 9-307(1).210
208. See IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9-307 (Burns Supp. 1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.26
(Page Interim Supp. 1983).
209. A search service has developed in Des Moines, Iowa. Phone searches through this private
company are rapid; a request about a debtor is made in the morning and in the afternoon of the same
day the person making the request has the information. In fact, if one is willing to hold, the
information can be obtained while the caller waits. It also appears that the service will be
1)mputcrized and the infirmation will be available soon through computer terminals. The search
firm is Iowa Public Record Search, Inc., Box 6129, East Des Moines States, Des Moines, Iowa
50309. Telephone: 515-244-2463. Other states are developing computer data bases.
210. A provision dealing with farm products was added to S 9-301(i)(c). See supra note 87 and
accompanying text. The Review Committee recommended that the farm products rule be an
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Today problems of uniformity exist and the whole agricultural
marketing and credit structure needs evaluation. This means
examining more than sections 9-307(1) and 9-306(2). Examples of
areas that should be considered are: 1) the impact of sections 2-403
and 7-205, which prevent the unpaid farmer from reclaiming
warehoused grain sold by the warehouseman to a good faith
purchaser or buyer in the ordinary course of business;2 1 ' 2) the
impact of the inability of creditors to force farmers into
bankruptcy;2 12 3) the impact of 9-306(4)(d) upon the farm
lender; 213 4) the impact of a rule requiring instantaneous money
transfers by the use of some method like debit or bank cards when
farm products are sold; and 5) the problems presented when sellers
from multiple states are involved. Although 9-307(l) is much
maligned, there is virtually no empirical evidence concerning the
magnitude of the losses caused by 9-307(1) or whether buyers or
commission merchants really have tried to utilize the Code's notice
system. On the other hand, no evidence exists showing that money
optional amendment to 9-307(1) instead of remaining as part of 9-307(1). U.C.C. app. II, at 882
(1978) (comments of the Review Committee for Article 9). It was recognized that there was sharp
division concerning the rule. Id. The Permanent Editorial Board rejected this optional amendment
and concluded that 9-307(1) should not be changed. Id. n.5 See U.C.C. S 9-307 (1978). The
American Law Institute's discussion of the farm products rule is interesting:
JUDGE BRAUCHER: If we may go on to 9-307 we now get to the protection of
buyers of goods as against a security interest in those goods. I think I should call your
attention to a non-change in 9-307, Subsection (1). As we submitted it to you a year
ago we proposed the deletion of the words in the second and third line "other than a
person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations."
This would allow the usual inventory principle to operate in cases of farm
products. That was the proposal a year ago.
On Page 209, beginning on 208 and running over to 209, there is an explanation
of why the committee recommended that. But the committee, at least one member of
the committee, became more dubious about this. This is the one item where we really
did get to a contest between identifiable economic interests and what we were doing
was taking on the organized farm lenders on behalf of the organized processors of farm
products. And when the giants collide, the ordinary people should get out of the way.
And the Permanent Editorial Board, as shown in the footnote on Page 209, took
that view of it and deleted the recommendation which had been watered down by that
time to a recommendation that this be optional. And we left it to a contest of strength.
And all that remains is that if you are going to do it, these are the words you do it with.
I think it is fair to say that the committee still thinks the change they
recommended a year ago was sound in principle. But it obviously dolesinvolve the
difference of economic interests between highly organized groups. It-is not a mere
technical matter, and we do not propose it to you at this time.
Braucher, Discussion of Final Report of Review Committeefor Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48
A.L.I. PROC. 327 (1971).
211. See U.C.C. S 2-403, 7-205. Section 2-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that
the "entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power
to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." Id. S 2-403(2).
Section 7-205 provides: "A buyer in the ordinary course of business of fungible goods sold and
delivered by a warehouseman who is also in the business of buying and selling such goods takes free
of any claim under a warehouse receipt even though it has been duly negotiated." Id. S 7-205.
212. See supra note 202 and accompanying text for a discussion of the special protections for
farmers under bankruptcy.
213. See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of S 9-306(4)(d) of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
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will dry up if the farm products rule is made permanent. Of course,
the presence and impact of the computer age cannot be ignored.
One possible approach for the Board is to recommend that
have introduced
Congress federalize section 9-307(1). Legislators
2 14
bills designed to accomplish this in the past.
There are a number of legitimate arguments supporting the
view that Congress should act. There is a need for a uniform law
not only because state laws vary, but also because farm products
can easily be, and are, moved from one state to another to be sold.
Packers ,215 market agencies, 216 and dealers 2 17 purchasing livestock
have a peculiar problem in that under the Packers & Stockyard Act
they must pay for their purchases within twenty-four hours. 21 8

This, they argue, makes it impossible to verify the existence of
security interests because many buy from producers located in
different states. Filing rules vary from state to state and many filing
officers will not provide information over the phone.
There are, however, a number of reasons why Congress
should not be involved. Traditionally, commercial transactions
have been regulated at the state level. Second, the fact that the
states have different versions of section 9-307(1) does not justify
federal legislation because this is not the only part of the Code that
is non uniform. More than twenty states have amended Code
section 2-315, which deals with implied warranties when livestock
is sold. There are three basic filing rules in effect.
There is also a split in the states concerning whether a farmer
is a merchant. 219 Finally, farmers are upset about sections 2-403
and 7-205, which provide that farmers cannot retrieve their stored
grain, sold by the storing warehouse, from a good faith purchaser
214. See, e.g., S.2190, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 16,953 (1983); H.R. 3296, 3297,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 10,583 (1983).
215. A packer is defined as:
A Iny person engaged in the business (a) of buying livestock in commerce for purposes
ol'slaughter. or (b) of manufacturing or preparing meats or meat food products for sale
or shipment in commerce, or (c) of marketing meats, meat food products, or livestock
products in an unmanufactured form acting as a wholesale broker, dealer, or
distributor in commerce.
7 U.S.C. 5 191 (1982).
216. Market agency is defined as "any person engaged in the business of (1) buying or selling
7 U.S.C.
in commerce livestock on a commission basis or (2) furnishing stockyard services.
S 201(c) (1982).
217. A dealer is "any person, not a market agency, engaged in the business of buying or selling
in commerce livestock, either on his own account or as the employee or agent of the vendor or
purchaser." 7 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1982).
218. See 7 U.S.C. § 228b (1982). See supra note 169 for the text of§ 228b.
21-. Cwnpare Nelson v. Union Equity Coop. Exch., 548 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977) (farmer is
a merchant) with Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976) (wheat farmer
is not a merchant). See also Annot., 95 A.L.R.3n 484 (1979) (whether farmers are "merchants"
within meaning of Article 2 to the Uniform Commercial Code).
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or buyer in the ordinary course if the warehouse fails to pay the
farmer. 220 State legislatures have been asked to reverse this rule and
will be asked again to change the rule. If farmers are unsuccessful
at the state level, they would surely seek federal legislation to
change section 9-307(1). Consequently, the only way to create a
uniform law would be for Congress to enact a federal UCC.
Even if Congress were to change section 9-307, buyers of crops
produced on rented land would still have to contend with unpaid
landlords and landlord liens in many states. Landlord liens are
excluded from coverage of the Code by section 9-104(b). 221 Thus, a
court would decide priority battles by some other law. Some states
have provided by statute that a purchaser of crops, produced on
222
rented land, takes subject to a landlord's lien.

Even if the farm products rule were eliminated, the buyer
could still lose. This could result when the buyer purchased goods
paying with a single payee check knowing the goods were subject to
223
a perfected security interest.
The Board could, after considering all the possible
ramifications of the farm products rule, recommend that the rule be
abandoned or retained. A compromise may be retention of the rule
with required central filing for farm products and instant access to
the information via the telephone or through computer terminals.
Iowa's experience with central filing and instant access of
information through telephone searches has apparently been
positive. No doubt local filing officers who do not want to lose
revenue and believe the public is best served by local officials will
resist these changes. Others may resist because it is too costly to
change. If the states do not want to appropriate enough money or
are unwilling to permit the filing officers to charge enough and keep
the revenue to operate the offices, then perhaps the Board should
recommend that Congress adopt and create a central filing system
similar to the one used for airplane security interests. 224 Of course,
Congress would be required to fund the office appropriately to keep
220. U.C.C.
2-403, 7-205 (1978). See supra note 211 and accompanying text fora discussion
of §S 2-403, 7-205.
221. U.C.C. §9-104(b) (1978). Section 9-104(b) provides: "'his Article does not apply . . . to
a landlord's lien ...." Id.
222. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2526 (1983). Section 58-2526 provides: "The person
entitled to the rent may recover from the purchaser of the crop, or any part thereof, with notice
[actual and constructive] of the lien the value of the crop purchased, to the extent of the rent due and
damages." Id.
223. See U.C.C. SS 9-307(1) comment 1 ("buyers of goods take free of a security interest even
ihough pcirlicted"); 1-201(2) (definition of "aggrieved party"): 1-201 (19) (definition of "good
litiih"). 1-201 (25) (definition of"notice").
224. Seegenerally49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976); 14 C.F.R. Pt. 49 (1983).
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filing and searches up to date and provide quick and easy access to
the records. The users apparently could provide this financing.
V. CONCLUSION
While there is no doubt that the economic hard times on the
farm have caused many to focus on the farm products rule, the rule
should not be rejected without some serious thought being given to
what impact it will have upon the availability of credit. Credit has
become an essential part of most farm operations today; if the
lenders were to severely cut back on loans, it could have a
substantial impact on farmers. Those particularly vulnerable are
the younger and unestablished farmers. Moreover, there are few
cases in which buyers were required to pay twice. Finally, if buyers
and lenders alike could be protected by central filing and quick
access to the filed information, it should be tried. In any event,
there is a need for a uniform law and the appropriate body to
consider the problem is the Permanent Editorial Board of the
Uniform Commercial Code.

